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0. Introduction 
As many writers, analyst or people related to finance say, Mergers & Acquisitions 
transactions are most of the times not profitable or they do not “create value”, making the 
acquirer’s shareholders lose money. Even it is estimated that “around 50% of mergers don’t 
achieve their business objectives […] according to several studies conducted over the past 
four decades” (Kumar, 2009).  
This research paper tries, in first place, to understand and explain a bit more the 
process and the facts of M&A transactions, taking a deeper look at value creation, what it 
is and how it can be measured. So later, it will try, by analysing some past transactions in 
Europe, explain or conclude which factors are more important to succeed in this type of 
activities, as well as understand how this world is nowadays (volume of transactions, size 
of them, countries and industries of the companies, etc.). 
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Chapter I. Literature Review 
As Bower (2001) said, “we know surprisingly Little about mergers and 
acquisitions, despite the buckets of ink spilled on the topic”. Indeed, the acquisition of one 
firm by another is one of the most controversial activities that corporate finance challenges 
daily, if not the most. Nevertheless, this research paper will try to explain as precise as 
possible these activities and their motivations to take place, as well as have a look at the 
past evolution of them. Later we will take a look at value creation, what it is, why it is 
important and how it can be measured, as this will be an important aspect for the 
management of any acquiring company. Finally, we will analyse the factors that can 
contribute these transactions to succeed or fail. 
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1. M&A process 
1.1. Ecosystem 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions refer to all type of financial 
transactions that involve the consolidation of companies or assets. These transactions 
include mergers, acquisitions, consolidations, tender offers, purchase of assets and 
management acquisitions, but in all cases, two companies must be involved. The two 
transactions more common and more analysed worldwide, and therefore the name of 
M&A, are mergers and acquisitions. 
As Ross, Westerfield and Jordan (2019) established, from a legal point of view, 
when a firm wants to acquire another one has up to three basic procedures: merger or 
consolidation, acquisition of stocks or acquisition of assets. Firstly, both merger and 
consolidation occur when there is a complete absorption between companies but the 
difference is that, on one hand, in a merger the resulting firm is the acquirer and the 
acquired firm ceases to exist, and, on the other hand, a in a consolidation process both 
companies cease to exist and a new firm is created. Secondly, when an acquisition is done 
through purchasing stocks of the other firm, by exchanging them with cash, shares or other 
securities, it can be done, or at least started, by a private offer between managements or 
with a public offer called tender offer. Thirdly, the last possibility that an acquirer has is to 
purchase the target’s assets, thus it will become propriety of the acquirer but without 
disappearing. 
As many financial writers and analysts do, as Ross et al. (2019) present, it is 
typically to classify the different acquisition or merger transactions into three different 
types: horizontal acquisition, vertical acquisition and conglomerate acquisition. The first 
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type includes all acquisitions between companies of the same industry; the second type 
involves firms from different industries or firms at different steps of the production process; 
and finally, the conglomerate acquisitions concern unrelated businesses, even though it is 
not as common as the two priors.  
1.2. Motivation of the different M&A deals 
Although the M&A literature pays a lot of attention to the post-transaction 
consequences and less to what are the factors that influence or motivate the initiative of an 
acquisition or a merge (Peng and Fang, 2009), those factors are not unique and there are 
numerous approaches to analyse them. 
For Dube and Glascock (2006), there are indeed many reasons that motivate those 
transactions, such as synergies, product or geographic diversification, growth, increased 
market power, control of scarce resources, or market discipline. All of them are strategic 
business and corporate objectives of the acquirer, who reaches the acquired firm, but they 
are not mutually exclusive, and it may be impossible to separate the effects of each of them 
(Coffee, Lowenstein and Rose-Ackerman, 1988). 
Marsh (2009) presents the four most popular theories used to explain M&A’s 
motivation: cost-transaction economics, RBV (Resource Based View), Business Behaviour 
Theory and Agency Theory. This involves two different levels of analysis: the first two 
theories describe the motives for acquisition at the enterprise level, while the second two 
describe them at the manager level. Marsh combines the bases of the different theories to 
address the acquisition decision itself: certain characteristics at the manager level strongly 
influence the enterprise’s motives for the acquisition. 
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As Bower (2001) mentioned, 
“Acquisitions occur for five reasons: to deal with overcapacity through 
consolidation in mature industries; to roll-up competitors in geographically 
fragmented industries; to extend into new products or markets; as a 
substitute for R&D; and to exploit eroding industry boundaries by inventing 
an industry”. 
In this research paper, and with all the literature review done, I think it is reliable 
to emphasise up to six basic and immediate reasons that motivate, or should motivate, 
pretty much all M&A transactions, many of which have been just mentioned. It is important 
to highlight, as prior cited, that they are not exclusive, and the acquirer might have more 
than one objective. Nowadays, those six reasons could be: synergies, diversification, 
strategic realignment, purchase of undervalued assets, tax considerations and/or gaining 
market power. 
1.2.1. Synergies 
Possibly synergies are the most commonly cited motivation for two companies to 
merge, but the concept has a very broad meaning. Synergies are generally understood to 
happen when two companies can generate more value for their respective shareholders by 
operating together than separately. Mellen and Evans (2010) define it as "a business 
combination that makes two plus two equal to five". Moreover, according to DePamphilis 
(2001), two types of synergies can be distinguished, fundamentally, operational and 
financial. 
On one hand, operational synergies are achieved through economies of scale and 
economies of scope. However, the benefit is not automatic, but its effectiveness will 
depend on the talent and skill of managers. Firstly, economies of scale consist of the 
distribution of fixed costs over a higher total production, so that the fixed unit cost will 
decrease as total production increases. Therefore, the higher the company's fixed costs, the 
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major reason for a merger or acquisition for economies of scale (DePamphilis, 2001). 
Secondly, synergies can also come from economies of scope, which consist of producing 
more, with the same resources, through the efficient use of those that are available 
(DePamphilis, 2001). 
On the other hand, the financial synergies refer to the impact of the operation on 
the acquirer within the scope of its cost of capital. The general financial theory is that if the 
cash flows of the participating entities are not correlated, the cost of capital should 
decrease, since, as Trautwein (1990) points out, the systematic risk of the investment 
portfolio will decrease. This type of synergies can also emanate from two sources, financial 
economies of scale and a better matching of opportunities with internally generated funds. 
The first way is based on the idea that larger companies should have a greater facility to 
issue debt, since the fixed issue costs will be spread over a larger amount. The same idea 
could be applied to share capital: the larger a company is, the easier it will be to raise capital 
(DePamphilis, 2001). 
The second way to obtain financial synergies is to combine a firm with an excess 
of cash, with a cash generation coefficient that is insufficient, which would mean a 
reduction in the cost of debt (Nielsen and Melicher, 1973). A mature company, with 
moderate growth, will produce a cash flow far in excess of its investment opportunities, in 
most cases. However, a developing company, or more so a start-up company, will need 
more investment and will not generate as much cash. In addition, the former will have a 
considerably lower financing cost than the latter. Therefore, if they were combined, the 
joint risk would be reduced and transaction costs would be saved, since the allocation of 
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resources would be infinitely more efficient, and all existing opportunities would be taken 
advantage of. 
Other classifications, such as those made by Trautwein (1990) or Dutodoir et al. 
(2014), distinguish a third group of synergies, the management ones, which are those that 
are materialized when the executives of the acquiring entity have greater planning and 
monitoring capacities than the executives of the other entities. Thus, they acquire at a lower 
price or with better conditions, which translates into greater profitability for their 
shareholders, and therefore greater value. 
Finally, mention that before any M&A transaction, the management of the acquirer 
should plan the synergies they hope to obtain through the transaction and classify them as 
expected, manageable and challenging. This classification will organise, more or less, the 
probability of acquiring each of the expected synergies.  
1.2.2. Diversification 
Diversification refers to a company's decision to move out of its main geographic 
or product markets, and business lines, and move into others. According to DePamphilis 
(2001), there are two arguments that justify diversifying a company, reducing shareholder 
risk and taking advantage of opportunities offered by sectors with higher growth potential 
than the markets in which the company is currently at. 
Through diversification, the company will achieve a more stable income, as it will 
not depend on a single market. The lower the correlation between entities' cash flows, the 
greater the reduction in investment volatility. The direct consequence will be greater 
confidence in the company on the part of investors and financial institutions, which will 
mean a reduction in the cost of capital.  In the second scenario, if the company's traditional 
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market has weak growth rates and the company has excess cash, which is common in 
mature markets, companies will try to capture all growth opportunities, either by entering 
different markets or by launching new products in their market.  
Two companies with a presence in radically different markets can be integrated in 
pursuit of this objective, here is where M&A transactions play their role. The problem that 
diversification can entail is the difficulty in finding synergies, as the businesses will 
probably have no relationship between them. 
1.2.3. Strategic realignment 
Business environments change rapidly in many aspects, but the legal and 
technological dimensions are especially important, because they are factors that can lead a 
company to lose the right to act in a market due to a regulatory change or to be far behind 
its competitors, if it is not able to adapt to technological advances. At the same time can 
lead a company to lead a market if it adapts quickly. In this sense, M&A can help 
companies adapt extremely quickly to these changes in the environment. In fact, this was 
one of the factors that drove the wave of mergers in the United States in the 1990s. 
Firstly, during the last quarter of the twentieth century and the dawn of the twenty-
first, we can appreciate a liberalizing tendency, with a regulation that lays the foundations 
of economic activity, but leaves room for action to the subjects. According to authors such 
as Jensen (1993), Mitchell and Mulherein (1996) or Boone and Mulherein (2007), the less 
regulated markets favour acquisitions, since a more lax regulation, that does not impose an 
infinite number of barriers, favours competition in the market, so that companies will use 
these schemes to position themselves strategically in the market.  
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Current regulation, although it safeguards free competition in the market, is 
restrictive and a barrier to mergers in some cases. For example, when Pfizer put its baby 
food line on the market in 2002, Nestlé's interest was counterbalanced by the US 
competition authorities' demand to sell part of the business in order not to take over the 
entire market. 
Secondly, technological change is a clear reason for M&A transactions, as 
companies must adapt to the environment and try to reach all their customers, so as not to 
lose opportunities or give advantages to their competitors, and through a merger or 
acquisition a company can overcome with new products, new markets and competitors. 
For example, the industrial revolution and railways led to a greater interrelation of markets, 
and the areas in which each company competed were expanded, due to greater ease and 
speed in transporting goods and people (DePamphilis, 2001). Since changes often occur 
quickly, external growth is used as a more viral form of adaptation, rather than internal 
growth, which takes time to develop and implement. 
This reason is frequently used nowadays, where technological changes are very 
rapid, as for example Facebook taking over WhatsApp to maintain its leadership in mobile 
application communications and social networks, or Microsoft that acquired Skype due to 
the technological revolution that it meant, instead of developing its own software, which 
they estimated would mean a higher cost and more time.  
In line with this strategy, start-ups play an important role in today’s world, where 
there are a large number of them, as they can innovate and adapt to changes quite easily 
and quickly in most cases, due to their size. Therefore, large companies, with a very strict 
bureaucracy and less room for manoeuvre, look at them as a purchase objective once they 
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have implemented a successful technology. As already said, it can be more interesting to 
buy a technology already developed and with some success, instead of investing time and 
resources, especially given the shorter life cycle of the products and the high competition 
currently existing. In addition, these acquisitions may also aim to keep out of reach of 
competitors technologies with which they could displace their product. 
1.2.4. Purchase of undervalued assets 
When a company wants to expand and grow, it can develop technology and invest 
in internal growth or opt for external growth, acquiring a company to incorporate its assets. 
The second option is especially interesting when the company is undervalued, meaning 
when the acquisition price of the company is lower than the replacement cost of all its 
assets, individually considered. In this situation, the ratio-q, developed by DePamphilis 
(2001) for this purpose, will be less than 1 (ratio-q < 1). Therefore, buying undervalued 
assets is a quick and easy way to make a profit, but the difficulty lies in identifying 
undervalued companies and, above all, studying them in order to detect possible 
contingencies that may arise and, ultimately, represent a high cost for the acquiring entity. 
1.2.5. Tax considerations 
Although the tax issue related to any M&A transaction is complex and broad, it is 
necessary to briefly discuss, on the one hand, the tax reasons that may motivate a merger 
or acquisition and, on the other hand, the tax issues that must be taken into account when 
carrying out the operation, which will conclusively influence the decision whether or not 
to carry it out. 
In the first place, the fundamental tax reason for undertaking an operation of this 
type is to take advantage of the tax credits that the acquired entity has in its balance sheet, 
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due to the losses obtained during previous years. These credits will allow savings in the 
payment of taxes on the benefit of the acquirer or the resulting entity (Devos et al, 2008). 
In second place, depending on the accounting method used to account for the 
acquisition, tax benefits may arise from the operation. If the acquirer's assets are revalued, 
depreciations and amortisations also change, with the resulting tax savings. Therefore, 
when considering whether or not to make a merger or acquisition, the way in which the 
operation is structured will surely be of capital importance, from a tax point of view. 
When acquiring, the most common is the use of an acquisition vehicle, which could 
be a local holding company, the foreign parent, a non-resident intermediary holding 
company, or a local subsidiary. Other less common vehicles, such as joint ventures, could 
also be used. The other big decision is how to finance the acquisition, with local or foreign 
debt, capital or hybrid instruments. The main advantage of debt is the possible deductibility 
of interest and commission expenses. However, if capital is issued to finance the operation, 
neither the issuance costs nor the subsequent distribution of dividends will be deductible. 
However, in order to take advantage of both the tax credits and all the possibilities of 
deduction, it will be necessary for the resulting entity to have sufficient profits for the next 
four years, otherwise it would lose those rights. 
On the seller's side, a structure will be sought that allows the target shareholders to 
defer, over several fiscal years, the profits obtained from the sale, so that they can distribute 
the tax payment and reduce it as much as possible. If the transaction is not tax-free, as a 
general rule, the seller will ask the buyer for compensation for payment of transaction 
taxes. 
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1.2.6. Gaining market power 
Finally, companies always try to improve their position in the market, since the 
greater their presence and market share, the better their competitive situation will be and 
the greater their profitability will be to their shareholders. Therefore, the extreme, most 
comfortable and simple situation for a company is the monopoly, because they will be able 
to set prices and levels of supply and will not have to worry about attracting customers, or 
what their competitors do, because they would be the only bidders in the market. However, 
in many countries this would be an ideal situation, as Governments regulate the commerce 
prohibiting monopolies in order to assure free competition.  
Devos et al. (2008) point out that, when we talk about market power, we can apply 
it to the company's suppliers or its customers. Therefore through horizontal integrations in 
M&A transactions, greater power will be achieved for the acquiring company over the 
suppliers and customers at the same time. On one hand, by eliminating competitors, 
suppliers will have one less customer to supply, thereby strengthening the position of the 
acquiring entity. While on the other hand, customers will have one less entity to turn to in 
order to meet their needs. 
1.3. Position of the so-called “emerging giants” 
Several recent studies analyse the position and the strategy of the so-called 
“emerging giants”, which basically are the biggest or more important companies from 
developing countries such as India, China, Malaysia, South Africa or Russia. As for 
example the Harvard Business Review, which published an article from Nirmalya Kumar 
(2009), among others. 
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It is important to study and understand their position and strategic view for the 
M&A process, as it is quite different from the western companies of the developed 
countries. 
On one hand, despite all the motivations that lead to mergers in developed countries 
as we saw previously, these “Western companies” search an improve in their efficiency 
and growth, trying to beneficiate from synergies in order to reduce costs (Kumar, 2009). 
On the other hand, emerging giants from developing countries are beyond the period when 
they used M&A mainly to chase growth and, therefore, they lacked the knowledge and 
tools to stay efficient and be competitive with other major players. Nowadays they are 
using M&A transactions to “obtain competencies, technology and knowledge” while 
having a “clear long-term vision […] willing to wait for their takeover to pay off”, in 
contrast with the short-term objectives in developed countries (Kumar, 2009). The same 
Kumar stated that those emerging giants are “using M&A as their main globalization 
strategy and generating more value from takeovers than their counterparts from developed 
nations”. 
Therefore, even if it is possible that is not an easy task, this strategy with takeovers 
should be further analysed and applied in developed countries, trying to focus on long-term 
objectives and make those transactions profitable on the long run. Also, it is important that 
they keep on this direction in the developing countries in order to keep competitivity 
worldwide. 
As said, it is not an easy task, and Jullens (2013) well relates that developing 
capabilities is a slow process and that those capabilities should be acquired in four stages: 
“1. Seize the moment; 2. Build strength; 3. Scale and consolidate; 4. Move up and out”. 
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1.4. Historic overview 
The worldwide market of acquisitions is highly active with an average transaction 
value of $1 trillion per year (Berk et al., 2014). In fact, this high volumes have been 
happening for many years now, leading to the possibility of characterizing the market by a 
concentration of merger waves, which basically are periods with intensive activity, 
followed by periods with sporadic activity. Although when the merger waves are 
mentioned it usually refers to M&A activities at the aggregate level, it is beginning to talk 
about waves of M&A activities at the sectorial level (as for example Boone and Mulherin, 
2007; among others). 
1.4.1. Merger Waves 
As McNamara (2008) defines, acquisition waves are defined as a period of about 
six years where the peak year of acquisition activity doubles the base year, and where the 
subsequent decline is more than 50%. Therefore, the waves imply that operations induce 
more operations, resulting in a domino effect on M&A activities and thus increasing market 
concentration. 
Operations tend to occur in periods of economic recovery (following an economic 
downturn, energy crisis, or market collapse) and may be conditioned by regulatory changes 
as well as influenced by technological or industrial changes (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008). Although each wave is characterized by different types of reasons and motives, 
there can be found a number of common factors and match with periods of rapid credit 
expansion that are accompanied by stock market booms, while correlating with bull 
markets. At the end, M&A activities are often interrupted by stock market crashes and the 
subsequent period of economic recession. 
  21 
The differences in patterns and their results over the decades can be attributed to 
the heterogeneity of the triggers of each wave. Emphasizing that the first operations in each 
wave is motivated by an abrupt change in the industry (Gregoriou and Renneboog, 2007). 
Figure 1 shows the volume (in this case percentage) of public companies taken over 
since 1926, exposing that the greatest periods of M&A activities were in the 1960s, 80s, 
90s and 2000s. Firstly, the high activity in the 1960s is known as the “conglomerate wave” 
as firms were acquiring unrelated businesses, as the type of acquisition already explained 
in this research paper. Secondly, in the 1980s there was the “bust-up” (or hostile) takeover 
wave, in which the acquirer searched for underperforming firms to later sell all of its 
individual business units separately to make a profit. Later, everything refined to the 
“strategic” or “global” wave, in the 90s, as the merged companies had related businesses 
or activities and the ultimate goal of the acquisitions was to create strong and competitive 
firms. Finally, at the end of 2004 a new wave escalated marked by the consolidation of the 
telecommunications and software industry, among others. 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of public companies taken over each quarter, 1962-2012. 
Source: Calculations of Berk et al. (2014), based on Center for Research in Securities 
Prices data. 
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Several authors confirm the behaviour of cycles and merger waves as has been 
exposed: Lambrecht (2004) indicates that waves typically coincide with periods of 
economic expansion and slow down during recessions and also analyses the timing of 
mergers motivated by economic shocks, demonstrating that companies have clear 
incentives to merge in periods of economic expansion; Dube and Glascock (2006) say that 
it has long been recognized (quoting Reid, 1968) that M&A are highly correlated with 
general economic activity; Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) incorporate competition and 
imperfect information to determine the terms and timing of operations, through the 
resolution of solving option exercise games between bidders and targets. 
With that in mind, the grouping of transactions also responds to other corporate 
motivations: the anticipation of potential mergers after the regime change creates 
incentives to engage in additional mergers (Gorton, Kanh and Rosen, 2009). The race to 
increase company size via mergers may be the result of defensive or positioning reasons. 
According to these authors, defensive mergers take place because when managers are 
sufficiently concerned with maintaining control, they want to acquire other companies to 
avoid being acquired themselves. This defensive position is simple as by growing through 
acquisitions, a company is less likely to be acquired by becoming older than some of its 
rivals, so this later makes others more vulnerable as targets, which induces them to 
undertake defensive acquisitions in turn. At some point this causes the "eat-or-be-eaten" 
scenario, where unprofitable defensive acquisitions are ahead of some or all profitable 
acquisitions. 
1.4.2. First mover advantage theory 
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Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) introduced the “first mover advantage theory” 
in the M&A activity, based on the asymmetry of information, in which a pioneer is able to 
capitalize his best information to identify and act to get a position of advantage over their 
equivalents. This advantage has three basically origins: technological leadership, right of 
priority of assets and the generation of buyer switching costs. Later, McNamara, Haleblain, 
and Dykes (2008) confirm this theory, by virtue of which the acquirer can benefit from 
early response transactions but may suffer from a delayed response as a bandwagon. In 
fact, these first acquisitions not only have better results or better returns than the later ones, 
but also on average make a profit. Thus, the market penalises the followers, those who 
come after the pioneers or early movers, by being the ones that get the worst returns on the 
M&A deals. 
Analysing a little further this theory, it is not as straight forward as it seems, as the 
good returns of the pioneers is not just because of the “early move” , as experience and the 
stability of the market play an important role as well, while the bad returns of the followers 
can be more or less accentuated depending on this stability of the market. So early 
movements have more positive results in stable environments and followers suffer more 
than in dynamic environments. Although not always entering first is an advantage 
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998), as for example when the speed of technological 
innovations allows later entrants to exploit market opportunities more cost-effectively by 
imitating rather than innovating. 
As mentioned, the ability of early movers to achieve a leadership position through 
M&A may be greater in stable markets (Schmalensee, 2000 quoted by McNamara, 
Haleblain and Dykes, 2008). Furthermore, experience is also important, because infrequent 
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buyers are more exposed both to the benefits of an early movement and to suffering the 
consequences of being a follower. In all cases the tactics used by the acquirer influence the 
trend of results within the same wave, as well as the form of payment. 
The research of McNamara et al. (2008), show that companies that undertake 
acquisitions at the beginning of the cycle achieve better results for their shareholders, on 
average, than those that act towards the end of the cycle. Early movers have access to the 
largest number of potential targets (Peng and Fang, 2009), allowing acquirers to “pick from 
the litter”, and gradually it will be more difficult for companies to find the appropriate 
target. Besides, these early acquisitions also involve smaller targets (Goel and Thakor, 
2010) and generate more profits for management teams than the later ones in the same 
wave. Therefore, as already mentioned, this research attributes good timing as the success 
to M&A deals: acquirers at the beginning of a wave see their shares grow by more than 4% 
over what would be expected, based on past results and market trends, during the three 
weeks following the announcement of the M&A (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Curvilinear effects on the acquisition returns. 
Source: McNamara, Haleblain and Dykes (2008).  
  25 
2. Value creation fundamentals 
2.1. Theory of Value Creation 
As Trautwein (1990) pointed out, M&As seek the transfer of wealth and the 
generation of a benefit for the intervening entities and their shareholders. Moreover, 
through the value generated, it is possible to measure the long-term performance of the 
company, taking into account the interests of all stakeholders and not just those interests 
of the shareholders. Nevertheless, it is true that value is a variable that is difficult to 
quantify, as we will see further in this research paper, and the Theory of Value Creation 
entails the risk of generating bubbles or crises, but these can hardly be avoided by means 
of any other model. 
At this point, this theory enters in play as a main role, and it is based on the premise 
that value is the key factor and fundamental indicator of companies' performance, 
understanding value as the one that all stakeholders receive, and not only the shareholders. 
Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2010), argue that value is the fundamental measurement 
dimension in market economies and is therefore used to assess and judge companies. 
This theory is based on the premise that companies generate value by investing the 
capital they obtain from their investors, in order to generate future cash flows at a rate of 
return higher than the cost of capital. The faster the revenue generation, and the more 
attractive the rate of return, the more value will be generated. For this process to be 
sustainable over time, the company must find a competitive advantage that lasts and can 
be defended against its competitors (Koller et al., 2010). 
Still analysing the work of Koller et al. (2010), “companies dedicated to value 
creation are healthier and build stronger economies, higher living standards, and more 
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opportunities for individuals”. Their work emphasises again on the debate between 
stakeholder versus shareholder, pointing out that “pursuing shareholder value [as many 
companies do] does not mean that other stakeholders suffer”, as they analyse the 
employment stakeholder of companies. They demonstrate that “the United States and 
European companies that created the most shareholder value in the past 15 years have 
shown healthier employment growth”. In more detail, as shown in Figure 3, “companies 
with the highest total returns to shareholders (TRS) also had the largest increase in 
employment”. 
 
Figure 3. Correlation between TRS and employment growth. 
Source: Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2010). 
In addition, the customers of those companies are more satisfied, and their 
employees have a better perception of the treatment received and a greater sense of 
corporate responsibility than their rivals. As an additional advantage, competition for value 
creation forces both human capital and natural resources to be used efficiently, which will 
lead to an improvement in the company's competitiveness. 
It should not be forgotten that the main reason why a shareholder invests in a 
company is to make a profit, to obtain economic value through capital gains and dividends. 
If the company does not generate value for the shareholder, its shares and participations 
will be less attractive for investors. The absence of capital in the company will mean its 
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death in the markets. Therefore, it is essential to know how and how much value is created 
in companies. 
Companies provide value to their shareholders by investing at the present time to 
obtain a return in the future. The amount of value generated is the difference between the 
returns obtained and the cost of the investment, taking into account the fluctuation in the 
value of money over time and the risk involved in the investment. Therefore, the value 
generated by a company will ultimately depend on the return on investment, revenue 
growth and the long-term sustainability of both. 
Any operation that makes an entity grow, whether in size, turnover or market share, 
implies value creation. However, the option with the highest growth does not necessarily 
have to be the one that provides the greatest value creation. Pay attention to the valid theory 
of the same Koller et al. (2010), among many other corporate related people, which 
establishes that the investment rate is equal to the quotient between growth and return on 
investment (both in percentage terms), just as follows: 
Investment rate = Growth Rate (%) ÷ Return on New Invested Capital (%) 
2.2. Main factors of success and failure 
Traditionally, the factors that are considered as success or failure for M&A 
transactions were classified between the two stages of pre- and post-acquisition operations. 
However, recent literature has dismissed this traditional classification arguing that these 
factors are transversal to the stages, so although we refer to the stage in which each factor 
is identified in each study, we do not include this classification in the structure of the 
factors. 
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“While critical success factors can be apportioned to specific phases in the 
M&A process, and the links between them identified, of key importance is 
the ability of firms to manage the transition from pre-acquisition to post-
acquisition phase.” (Gomes, Angwin, Weber and Tarba, 2013) 
The same authors (Gomes et al., 2013) state that deepening the relationship between 
key success or failure factors in the pre-acquisition phase can improve the understanding 
of which combinations of factors may have more explanatory power over the results of 
operations. They ensure that potential combinations of factors have not been sufficiently 
studied by the literature, and the same thing happens with post-acquisition Researchers 
focus attention on pre-acquisition variables forgetting that it is in the post-acquisition phase 
where value is generated, and there are few studies that examine the interrelations between 
the different key factors in this phase. Their study on the different factors conclude with a 
schematization of the key factors in the various stages and the relationships between them, 
as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Pre- and post-acquisition success factors and studies of its interrelationships. 
Source: Gomes et al., 2013. 
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Gomes et al. (2013) advocate the connection between critical success factors within 
each phase and throughout the phases themselves and that discussion of the value of each 
factor can be enhanced by considering how it can influence and be influenced by other 
critical success variables both within and throughout the phases of the M&A process. 
Now I will quickly analyse those factors, classifying them into two main groups: 
hard factors, which can be measured and quantifiable and tangible, and soft factors, which 
are more difficult to quantify insofar as they are perceptions, motivations and feelings. 
2.2.1. Hard factors 
There are several hard factors that determine the operations, apart from the most 
recurrent that we deal with in the following epigraphs, later we analyse those specific ones 
on which some authors focus. 
a) Target company selection 
Once the need for M&A has been established, the first step for the acquirer (Gomes 
et al., 2013) must be the choice of a strategic partner in terms of its strengths and 
weaknesses, future investments, quality of the target management team and the assessment 
of barriers including cultural differences and human resource implications, such as 
executive turnover, all through a diligent process. The choice has to be made in terms of 
strategic fit and organisational fit, as this fit is conducive to good results for the operation. 
Companies and their advisors should do a better job of selecting candidates, while avoiding 
falling in love with the target company (Lynch and Lind, 2006). Wang and Zajac (2007) 
contribute that the similarity of resources and complementarity combined with relational 
and socio-specific capacities make the choice of certain partners more likely. 
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Thus, a determining factor in the choice of target is the complementarity of the 
resources of acquirer and acquired, that King et al. (2004) reveal, identifying that the fact 
that the resources are complementary implies that there is a positive interaction between 
the resources of both companies. To the extent that post-acquisition results require the 
combination of the resources of both, if these are complementary, they can have a 
multiplicative effect that can be a framework for explaining synergies. 
Kim and Finkelstein (2009) raise the effect of complementarities in product strategy 
and geographic markets on M&A results and explicitly consider the role of the company's 
strategic profile in the potential value it can gain via complementarities. Although it is 
possible to determine acquisition in terms of the degree of similarity between industries, a 
deeper survey of the degree of complementarity in product strategies is also informative, 
for example recent studies on diversification show that intra-industry diversification is 
advantageous precisely because the unique industry context facilitates sharing of resources 
within and across product lines. 
What is more, similarity and complementarity should not be seen as theories in 
dispute over the results of M&A. The results of operations are a function of the creation of 
synergies of both similarity and complementarity (Wang and Zajac, 2007). These authors 
put it in terms of “how similar should the two companies be?”. And they conclude that the 
key is whether the assets, resources or strategies of both companies are mutually 
reinforcing when they can potentially be combined or reconfigured to create value. A value 
that did not exist in either of the two original entities and this does not necessarily apply 
only to two companies within the same sector, but also applies between connected sectors 
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and not only product but also in other cases, such as functional complementarity (i.e. 
between research and distribution). 
About the relative position of the companies that combine, according to O'Connor 
(2006) buyers in their search for competitive strengths typically look for companies with a 
strong position in their markets and high barriers to entry. When they do so look for fit, 
they generally analyse whether the two companies are aligned and where they complement 
each other. The factors to consider in the target search are growth rates, profitability, 
market capitalization, product line, distribution channels, key competencies, productivity 
ratios, management philosophy and size and type of human resources. During this process 
the focus is normally on the global strategic fit, leaving other factors to the risk of closing 
the operation and integration, which can lead to costly mistakes. 
Hassan et al. (2015) emphasize on the importance of target evaluation, which is 
more professional if carried out by an independent third party. It is important that the 
evaluation parameters are adequate to ensure a consistent evaluation process, in addition 
to the fact that the evaluation of results has to be sufficiently defined both during selection 
and during evaluation. In any case, the evaluation of the target is related to the rest of the 
process, including the integration, as it must take into account the planned post-closure 
interventions and the integration strategy that must be a function of the objective of the 
acquisition strategy (Lemieux and Banks, 2007) and the results of the due diligence, 
otherwise an acquirer may be paying an excessive premium for a certain target. 
b) Size matters 
Several studies such as the ones of Homberg, Rost and Osterloh (2009) or 
Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar and Travlos (2013) refer to size, both in absolute terms and 
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in terms of comparison between acquirer and target in the ability to exploit each type of 
synergy, but the issue of size is recurrent throughout the literature in different approaches. 
We will analyse three of those different approaches: the size of the operation, the size of 
the company and the relative size between acquirer and acquired. 
Firstly, the size of the transaction matters, as small acquisitions can be considered 
"incorporations" that can take place without a significant change in the acquiring 
organization and do not raise the same kind of challenges or possibilities in either the 
acquisition or integration process as the large acquisitions. Therefore, some authors, as 
Nogeste (2010), consider that they should not be considered equal in terms of dynamics 
and requirements. On the other hand, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) document 
that the focus on large operations can provide an incomplete picture of the impact of 
acquisitions on shareholder wealth, as large acquisitions tend to be less profitable than 
smaller ones. 
Secondly, there is quite a lot of literature review on the implications of the size of 
the companies on the creation of value through M&A transactions. For example, Buehler, 
Kaiser and Jaeger (2006) conclude that “big is better but not always” and that ultimately 
“large firms are more likely to merge than small firms”. In the same line, Handy (1998) 
establishes that:  
“The size of both business and life can mean lack of focus, too much 
complexity, and in the end too broad to be controllable. We need to know 
when big is big enough”. 
Other authors like Homberg et al. (2009) proclaim that the absolute size of the 
acquirer is extremely important, since smaller acquirers are more likely to capitalise an 
M&A, because they have more growth path, demonstrating that growth is naturally limited. 
And in this line, Park and Jang (2011) maintain that size also has an impact on the growth 
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of the post-F&A company. Finally, Alexandridis et al. (2013) record the following 
conclusions: 
• Large target acquisitions are associated with significantly lower premiums. 
• Large transactions are usually not associated with overpayments or high 
premiums, related to the complexity of the bids themselves. 
• Despite lower premiums and the possibility of small overpayments, the 
acquisition of large targets destroys more value for acquirers. 
Thirdly, in terms of relative size between acquirer and target, the literature preaches 
that similarity in terms of size of the organization plays an important role in the choice of 
suitable partners (Gomes et al., 2013). However, the evidence, also according to these 
authors, suggests that the purchase of smaller companies in relation to the acquirer can lead 
to sub-optimal results, and vice versa, the purchase of very large companies in relation to 
the acquirer can also lead to poor results (Moeller et al., 2004). The reasons, according to 
(Gomes et al., 2013) may be, in the first case that the post-acquisition tends to be ignored 
or attract too much attention in the eyes of managers of other parts of the acquiring entity, 
and in the second there is interference in the struggle for political power when each 
organization fights for dominance. 
On their behalf, Gorton, Kahl and Rosen (2009) state that the relative size of 
companies within an industry/sector is decisive for the propensity and profitability of 
operations in the following terms: first, M&A are more profitable in industries where larger 
companies are more profitable than other companies; second, in industries with more 
medium-sized companies it is more likely that M&A will occur. The same authors 
understand that the profitability of acquisitions tends to decrease with the size of the 
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acquirer, because large acquirers tend to pay premium while small acquirers tend to engage 
only in profitable acquisitions. Thus, this creates potential synergies, and makes future 
mergers more likely to create value, with larger targets being more attractive partners given 
economies of scale. As a consequence, the size of the company is an important determinant 
for target determination. 
People assume that a company can only buy a smaller one, but in reality there are 
reasons why a company rarely buys a larger one, because such an operation is more difficult 
to finance, raising funds and adding debt can increase the likelihood of financial problems 
and its managers would be more likely to lose their jobs (Gilson, 1989) and acquire it with 
the issuance of new shares would dilute the ownership of the acquirer in the combined 
company and perhaps lead to loss of control. These difficulties in acquiring larger 
companies may explain why in most M&A the acquirer is considerably larger than the 
target and why the likelihood of being a target decreases as the company increases in size. 
c) Synergies 
The synergies that are achieved in an merger or acquisition transaction are very 
broad and diverse, as already seen and analysed earlier in this research paper as the 
motivations that drive this type of transactions. But it is important to mention them again 
at this point, since the success of M&As is determined by the degree to which synergies 
are achieved. Therefore, it will be important to analyse weather the synergies are achieved 
and try to keep realistic when planning the acquisition, as for shareholders and managers 
will be important to achieve those that are expected. 
d) Time factor 
  35 
There are mentions on impacts of the time factor in several senses throughout the 
literature, and we will try to analyse some of them, from the different points of view from 
some authors. 
Firstly, in terms of what should be the time window for the evaluation of M&A 
results, Soongswang (2009) believes that “the larger the event window, the greater the 
increase in the amount of abnormal returns". One explanation for why the worldwide 
success rate is low is that the time period in which results are measured is restricted to a 
short term, usually two years, which may be insufficient time for employees and managers 
of companies involved in M&A to adjust post-acquisition changes (Quah and Young, 
2005) .Therefore, it is suggested to take a period of at least 7 years, as the longer the time 
window considered for the evaluation of the results, the more time the market has to correct 
any initial error in the evaluation of the acquirer, in addition to introducing more noise in 
the estimates (Mueller and Yurtoglu, 2007). 
In this sense, Comeau-Kirschner (2000) states that it takes approximately two years 
to achieve at least 15% of the total profit expected from the operation. After two years most 
of the problems have to be solved, the strategic plan be in place and the companies start to 
show benefits. In fact, Bert, MacDonald and Herd (2003) further adjust the time window 
by stating that 70-85% of synergies are achieved during the first 12 months after closing, 
and also that the companies that meet or exceed analysts' expectations in the first two years 
are the ones most likely to improve shareholder profitability. 
Secondly, as for the speed of integration, in terms quoted by Angwin (2004): 
“Speed has become the new mantra in business promising advantage, 
prosperity and success. It is now de rigeur in the domain of Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A) with a rising tide of practitioners and consultants 
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extolling the virtues of acting rapidly post-deal and the first 100 days, as 
critical for acquisition success.” 
This message has permeated M&A management in the form of a call for faster 
integration and a focus on the first critical days (Angwin, 2004), however this author warns 
of the risks of a non-critical acceptance of the benefits of speed in post-acquisition 
integration and, in this sense, considers the optimal speed of the change process in terms 
of integration times as part of the integration strategy of the acquirer. 
Authors such as Nikandrou, Papalexandris and Bourantas (2000) argue that the 
immediate post-acquisition period is the right time to implement the changes, because 
employees wait for it while they evaluate the intentions of the new management team. In 
the meantime, there are those who suggest a period of adjustment and knowledge before 
undertaking major changes (quoted Schweiger et al., 1993) but there is no empirical 
evidence in favour of any of these arguments. 
The speed of change must also be considered in cultural integration (Papadakis, 
2005), while determining the appropriate pace of change and how much change people can 
absorb, answering questions about how integration can be accelerated without destabilizing 
the system. 
Another element affected by the timing of the operation is, according to Angwin 
himself, the reduction in the uncertainty time of the workforce, which reduces the 
exponential effect that rumours have and also reduces the time available for the competitor 
to react to the new organization. However, the relationship between speed and success may 
not be as direct as it seems, so the first 100 days may not have such predictive power. In 
any case there are benefits and harms associated with the speed of integration that can 
affect the success of M&A. 
  37 
Thirdly, as regards the time before the operation, Lambrecht (2004) argues that high 
costs and increased market uncertainty tend to delay mergers, since market power 
strengthens the incentive to merge and accelerates merger activity.  
Finally, in terms of proactive candidate search, Cording, Christmann and King 
(2008) recognise the need for speed to respond to unexpected opportunities and 
recommend broad and proactive searches, which can be prolonged over long periods of 
time. Although all time references are a function of the economic moment and the market 
situation and undoubtedly evolve over time, so these quotations are only valid as an 
example. 
e) Leverage and liquidity 
Excess debt is considered another factor, which can act as a protective shield for 
the target company because it limits the path of possible M&A (Hege and Hennessy, 2010). 
In response to the risk of being acquired, managers may leverage the target to increase the 
value of the company, leading to a "disciplinary" purchase (Novaes, 2002). As already 
anticipated (Safieddine and Titman, 1999), high levels of leverage decrease the probability 
of being acquired because it commits the management team of the target to make the 
improvements that a potential buyer would have had to make, specifically the companies 
that have increased their leverage more after a failed purchase reduce their levels of 
investment, sale of assets, employment, increase focus and increase their operating cash 
flows. The quotes of the targets with increased leverage improve the benchmark over the 
next five years, which means that investors initially underestimate up to which values these 
companies were improved. 
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Jandik and Makhija (2005) confirm that shareholders of more leveraged targets 
achieve better results and operations involving highly leveraged targets tend to be more 
complex in terms of time, more likely to be associated with multiple bidders and greater 
price revision of the target's shares. Target leverage will affect not only the earnings of its 
shareholders, but also those of the M&A operation and suggests that this type of purchases 
is undertaken by acquirers with greater ability to generate profits. 
Later, Basu, Dastidar and Chawla (2008) indicate that target companies in general 
have greater liquidity, growth and size on the one hand and less risk, leverage, profitability 
and operational efficiency on the other, supporting the theory that purchases are a 
mechanism to improve market share, synergies through economies of scale, reduction in 
the cost of capital and the increase in debt capacity among other factors. 
f) Payment method 
An acquisition can be paid for in cash, shares or a combination of both cash and 
shares, although in some circumstances the acquirer may also issue debt and use other 
formulas. 
According to Bruner (2004), the literature shows that different methods of payment 
produce profound differences in results: being the operations in cash those that have 
positive returns and those that are in negative actions results. Under Bruner's own terms, a 
transaction will be paid in cash if the acquirer believes his shares are undervalued and with 
capital if he believes his shares are overvalued, so the use of cash may be indicative of 
managers' expectations of good results from the transaction. Therefore, in terms of market 
reaction, markets react more positively to F&A news in cash than in stocks. 
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The payment method only gives a signal about the vision of the managers of your 
business and their conviction about the success of the operation. But investors cannot rely 
solely on the form of payment as an indicator of their potential to create value (Mauboussin, 
2010), as an acquirer may have had to pay with shares because it does not have enough 
cash or debt capacity to finance a very attractive investment, for example. 
On one hand, the market reacts more favourably to cash transactions largely 
because the acquirer bears the full risk of return (Mauboussin, 2010), as such a buyer who 
uses cash is showing the market that he really expects the transaction to work. On the other 
hand, the use of shares as a means of payment allows the acquirer to share the risk of target 
overpricing with the target shareholders themselves and as a result the choice of shares as 
a form of payment is considered by some authors as a possible acquirer's response to 
uncertainty in target valuation. 
Finally, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) analyse the fact that cash offers are more 
frequent in the case of small targets, the markets react more positively to acquirers who use 
shares as a means of payment for operations, which implies that in these cases the choice 
of means of payment does not act as a signal to the market about the over or undervaluation 
of the offeror's capital. 
g) Premium paid 
The premium is the price paid by the target company that exceeds its pre-acquisition 
market value and its justified by the potential synergies that can be created in the 
combination of the two companies. It is paid mainly to encourage target shareholders to 
sell, even there can be other reasons as Hitt et al. (2009) confirm (such as agency factor, 
hubris, not realizing a good Due Diligence, not enough knowledge of the target, etcetera). 
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However, the premium should not and cannot be greater than the potential synergies if the 
acquisition produces positive results. Notice that it is difficult to predict the value that can 
be created through synergies and also achieve them due to the challenges of integration 
(Sirower, 1998). 
The literature, according to Gomes et al. (2013), has been pointing out that "paying 
too much" is an important cause of failure of operations and is a source of destruction of 
value, due to the difficulties of evaluation of the target company, especially in the case of 
international operations, due to the asymmetry of information (Seth et al., 2000). In fact, 
one of the factors considered significant in the results of operations (Hitt et al., 2009) is the 
magnitude of premiums paid on purchase, although it has been examined in a minority of 
studies. 
Laamanen (2007) studies those premiums paid, which he quantifies between 20 and 
30% of the total value of the acquisition, and states that, since the premium cannot be 
explained with synergies, previous research interprets it as a sign of poor quality in M&A 
decision making, competition to achieve the target or imitation of practices in use. There 
are even studies that argue that the payment of a high acquisition premium entails 
destruction of value for the acquirer's shareholders and others that use the size of the 
premium as a measure of the low quality of the decision-making process (Beckman and 
Haunschild, 2002). In any case, Laamanen (2007) proposes that if premiums continue to 
be paid, it is because of the existence of different combinations of target and acquirer 
resources that may be capable of creating value. Such combinations are difficult to identify 
and assign a value to using quantitative research instruments, a particularly relevant 
category being the case of investments in R&D targets, since technology-based companies 
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are more difficult to value than other companies in general. This author affirms that the 
premium is justified when the target resources are difficult because of their market to value 
and that the results are more intensely affected by the level of the total price of the target 
than by the influence of the premium, whose role is residual and can be used to adjust the 
market valuation upwards, but not to adjust the acquisition prices below the market value. 
h) Asymmetric information 
Asymmetric information is the difference in information between seller and buyer, 
they occur in all transactions and are, as we shall see, particularly large in the case of cross-
border transactions. Glendon (2010) in his doctoral thesis deals with the lack of qualitative 
evidence on the asymmetry of information among investors in M&A processes, however 
the asymmetry is present in one measure or another in many processes, often linked to the 
corporate governance model. 
In fact, the asymmetric information is a determining factor when it comes to a good 
estimate of the synergies expected from an operation, since the seller knows much better 
the true value of what he sells than the buyer (Chatterjee, 2007), synergies that can finally 
result in an acquisition premium. 
According to Schoenberg (2006), the ex-ante reactions of capital markets to 
announcements of acquisitions are not related to managers' ex-post valuations, reflecting 
the information asymmetry that may exist between investors and company management 
teams, particularly regarding implementation aspects. 
In the case of operations with geographical distance and especially trans-border 
operations, the asymmetry of information takes on special relevance. In fact, authors such 
as Basu and Chevrier (2011) raise information asymmetry in M&A processes as a result of 
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the distance between acquirer and target. According to Qiu and Zhou (2006), information 
asymmetries generate incentives for companies from different countries to enter M&A. 
Normally local companies, compared to foreign companies, have more information and are 
more familiar with the rules and working culture, effective ways of advertising, the 
distribution network, regulations and the interactions between consumers, suppliers and 
competitors, so that a merger with a local company is the only way for an international 
company to get it directly, so this information asymmetry creates incentives for merger 
between companies from different countries. 
Furthermore, as Benou, Gleason, and Madura (2007) indicate, investor preception 
may be more favourable when the acquisition involves visible targets and advice from 
reputable investment banks, and even media attention in this case may have an impact on 
valuation. 
On his behalf, Boeh (2011) explores the costs of contracting M&A, understood as 
fees paid and time required in the negotiation phase and concludes that buyers in 
international transactions tend to employ mechanisms that affect information asymmetry, 
which affects contracting costs, thus explaining why cross-border mergers are more costly 
and executed more quickly. In cases of important information asymmetry, companies use 
mechanisms to reduce it by increasing the generation of information through the use of 
public offers to obtain market information and by hiring advisers. 
i) Other specific factors 
One such case of specific factors is the importance of fixed assets in merging 
organizations and the location of headquarters (Cohen, 2010), which states that the 
geographic scope of physical operations and expected post-merger changes are 
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determinants of success in M&A and therefore defining a strategy in this regard has long-
term benefits such as cost control, revenue generation and organizational effectiveness. 
In the case of cross-border transactions, geographical distance and the legal 
environment are important factors, as analysed (Kengelbach, Schwetzler and Sperling, 
2010) in a study of 1507 transactions worldwide. Transactions between neighbour 
countries have better results than those with more distant countries (negative effect of 
neighbour country), which is explained because the acquirer does not benefit as much from 
a cross-border transaction with a nearby country, because it could serve him from his 
country of origin, so it offers a lower premium, which is directly reflected in the reaction 
of the capital market. 
Besides, decisions taken in certain functional areas also have an impact on the 
results of the operation, as in the case of information systems (IS). Mehta and Hirschheim 
(2007) examine the alignment between information systems and business in IT integration 
decisions in the context of M&A, and identify the factors that shape system integration 
decisions. They conclude that alignment only occurs two or three years after the merger, 
because alignment between business and information systems is a minor concern for 
organizations in the pre-merger and post-merger phases and it is only later in the integration 
process that organizations rethink their systems to align them with business needs. 
2.2.2. Soft factors 
Once the hard factors have been reviewed, we move on to review the soft factors, 
considering as soft those variables that are basically qualitative and difficult to quantify, as 
opposed to the hard variables that are based on measurable and quantifiable elements, 
which we have just covered in the previous section. 
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If there are two common features in the literature on M&A (Bogan and Just, 2009) 
it is that all explanations are based on the idea that the M&A decision is a rational action 
and that they fail to fully explain the observed empirical results. However, it is the soft 
factors, which should be widely analysed by the management of the acquiring company in 
other to succeed, but specially in order not to fail. 
There is general agreement among the authors that studying the impact of the 
human factor on the combination of organizations will lead to a better understanding of 
their success or failure (Bijlsma-Frankema, 2001), to the extent that the success or failure 
of an M&A deal depends on the individual's perception of how the process is handled and 
the direction in which the culture moves (Kavanagh and Ashkanasy, 2006). 
The way in which those transactions are managed is determinant of their results 
(Marks and Mirvis, 2001). It is no coincidence that a large percentage of transaction 
failures are attributed to employee-related problems (Nikandrou, Papalexandris and 
Bourantas, 2000). During the transactions, employees experience what has come to be 
called the "merger syndrome", which is accompanied by an increase in selfishness or self-
interest, as employees begin to worry about what integration really means to them, their 
income and their careers. In this sense, human resource management proves to be 
increasingly important for the outcome of M&As, which is not simply about financial 
transactions, but about processes that can significantly affect people's working lives (citing 
Cartwright and Cooper, 1996). 
The same Marks and Mirvis, who already described the syndrome as the main cause 
of individual and organizational cultural problems, state that a way to mitigate its effects 
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is a realistic preliminary view of the merger that provides relevant detailed information on 
the subject. 
If management plays an important role in initiating M&A, employees have a crucial 
role in the post-integration process (Meyer, 2008). Moreover, there are many of the so-
called soft factors that could be further developed, which would probably need an entire 
research paper. Some of those factors could be the transition in itself, social capital and 
capabilities, organisational identification, the headquarters, trust among employees and 
managers, communication, ethics and corporate social responsibility, culture differences 
and lace, and many other aspects or factors.  
2.3. Shared value 
After trying to explain and understand a little bit more about the value creation in 
the M&A transactions, as well as why do they succeed or fail, there is an important concept 
not yet presented and well related to value creation: “shared value”. This concept, fully and 
detailed explained by Porter and Kramer (2011), 
“can be defined as policies and operating practices that enhance the 
competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the 
economic and social conditions in the communities in which it operates; it 
focuses on identifying and expanding the connections between societal and 
economic progress”. 
Besides the plain definition, I think it is important to fully read and understand the 
article from these two writers in order to put it in practice to further develop M&A 
transactions, while escaping from old and outdated value creation philosophies. “The 
principle of shared value involves creating economic value in a way that also creates value 
for society by addressing its needs and challenges”. Therefore the “shared” in the name of 
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the concept, as it purchases the sharing of both the economic and social point of view. The 
whole society, specially the businessmen daily working in these type of transaction, 
“will require leaders and managers to develop new skills and knowledge, 
such as a far deeper appreciation of societal needs, a greater understanding 
of the true bases of company productivity, and the ability to collaborate 
across profit/non-profit boundaries”.(Porter and Kramer, 2011) 
Furthermore, they emphasise that this concept “has the power to unleash the next 
wave of global growth”. The activity of solving social problems is not in any corporate 
agenda, as they “have been ceded to governments and to NGOs”, but actually “companies 
can create economic value by creating social value”, and this is both really important to 
understand and really difficult to accept and apply. There are mainly “three key ways that 
companies can create shared value opportunities: by reconceiving products and markets, 
by redefining productivity in the value chain, and by enabling local cluster development”. 
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3. Measuring value creation 
I would like to make an important mention to the well-known book of Corporate 
Finance: Theory and Practice, as it is not only written my some of my professors from 
HEC Paris, but also has been useful during my Master’s in International Finance. A book 
written by Pascal Quiry, Maurizio Dallochio, Yann Le Fur and Antonio Salvi, which covers 
the full scope of corporate finance and is the ancestor of the other well-known book 
Finance d’Entreprise, written by Pierre Vernimmen. More precisely, the Chapter 19 of the 
same book covers the measure of the value creation in corporate finance, therefore the title 
for this section of the research paper. 
As explained before, value creation is an important issue for the entire financial 
industry and, therefore, being able to measure it becomes also important. Many indicators 
are used to measure value creation, even though they should be reduced to those that are 
truly reliable. In the Figure 5 there is a chronological appearance of different financial 
indicators, and as Vernimmen et al. (2014) stated:  
“predictably, the indicators cluster around a diagonal running from the 
upper left-hand corner down to the lower-right hand: this reflects the 
companies’ diminished ability to manipulate the indicators over time. 
Gradually, investors become more experienced and financial markets 
become more influential, and therefore are less prone to misinterpreting 
company data”. 
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Figure 5. Evolution of Financial Indicators. 
Source: Vernimmen et al., 2014. 
These authors organised the most important value creation indicators into three 
different categories: accounting, economic and market indicators. These most important 
indicators are presented and briefly explained hereafter, mostly based on the mentioned 
book. 
Before explained the main indicators, it is important to highlight that among those 
indicators when they are easier to use or to calculate (for example, because there is more 
information available to compute it or because the information needed is less complex) it 
means, in general, they might have some biases or be less precise or even make analyst 
mislead information.  
Let’s now explain, quite briefly, as it could go on for many pages and many analysis 
and many explanations, which are all those indicators and how can we generally compute 
them. 
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3.1. Accounting based indicators 
As Vernimmen et al. (2014) established, in general, accounting indicators are not 
really appropriate for measure value creation or for any other financial analysis, basically 
because they “can be manipulated” and “they may not consider the time value of money 
and the opportunity cost of capital”. Nevertheless, earnings per share (EPS) might be useful 
as it is believed that there is a relation between this criteria and value creation, which it 
does not mean that “by artificially boosting them you have created value”.  
Later, there is a “second-generation accounting indicators” which take a closer look 
to profitability, as for example the return on equity ratio (ROE) or the return on capital 
employed ratio (ROCE), which improves the problem of ROE that can be leveraged by 
raising debt (for example). 
Just quickly mention the formulas and methods of computing both ROE and ROCE, 
in order to understand them better, even though there are research papers on only these and 
other indicators that take a closer look into them. 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 = 𝑛𝑒𝑡	𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘	𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸 = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 · (1 − 𝑡𝑎𝑥	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 = 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑	𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
3.2. Economic based indicators 
After realizing that “profitability per se cannot fully measure value because it does 
not factor in risks, […] returns must also be compared with the cost of capital employed”, 
normally using the WACC (Weighted Average Cost of Capital), as Vernimenn et al. 
established. Therefore, we enter into the so-called economic indicators.  
  50 
3.2.1. Net Present Value (NPV) 
Clearly the most used indicator by any financial related person, as it “provides the 
exact measure of value creation”, which leads to a well-known indicator, largely analysed 
and used, which only has a drawback, especially for outsiders of the company, as it requires 
to be computed over several periods (as shown by the formula). Even though, having access 
to all information, this should be the indicator that we need to use. 
Basically, we have that creation of value can be computed as follows: 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑜𝑓	𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒	𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘	𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 
Which lately, for a giving project, knowing all the future profits it will get over the 
years, besides the WACC that affects the company, we get: 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 =K𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐	𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡L(1 +𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)L =K 𝐸𝑉𝐴L(1 +𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)LNLOPNLOP  
3.2.2. Economic Value Added (EVA) 
EVA can be defined as the changes in residual income along with the adjustments 
to the calculations in earnings and capital. It is a good indicator both for the retrospective 
evaluation of performances and also for prospective evaluation of performances. It can be 
computed as follows: 𝐸𝑉𝐴 = 𝐶𝐸 · (𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸 −𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶) = 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑇 −𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 · 𝐶𝐸 
3.3. Market based indicators 
3.3.1. Market Value Added (MVA) 
MVA measures the level of value a company has accumulated over time and it can 
be defined as the difference between the company's market value and book value. 
Therefore it can be computed as follows: 
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𝑀𝑉𝐴 = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑛𝑒𝑡	𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 − 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘	𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 
3.3.2. Total Shareholder Return (TSR) 
In words of the same authors, 
“TSR is the return received by the shareholder who bought the share at the 
beginning of a period, earned dividends, and values his portfolio with the 
last share price at the end of the period”. 
Therefore, we can compute TSR as follows: 
𝑇𝑆𝑅 = (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒	𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒	𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠	𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒	𝑎𝑡	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑏𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑜𝑓	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  
This indicator, along with the MVA, have a downfall or a drawback as the value 
measure can be lower, there might be a destruction of value, if the investor has some non-
favourable expectations regarding the future of the company’s profits.  
3.3.3. Abnormal return 
Abnormal return can be defined as the financial performance of a security or a 
portfolio in comparison with the market average, which basically means the difference 
between the actual return of a security or a portfolio and the expected return. The expected 
return is the return of a given benchmark, the market, and usually is a stock index (i.e. 
S&P500, FTSE, CAC40, Ibex35). Therefore, the abnormal return can be calculated as 
follows: 𝐴𝑅LT = 𝑅LT − 𝑅UT 
Where: 
• ARit is the abnormal return for a security or portfolio i at a specific time t 
• Rit is the return of the security or portfolio i at a specific time t 
• Rmt is the return of the given benchmark or market m at a specific time t 
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Chapter II. Case Study 
1. Objective of the case study 
In this case study I am trying to realise a small market analysis of the M&A 
transactions in Europe for the last years, and thereafter, an analysis to evaluate whether or 
not value is created. I have to say that this type of analysis should be much wider and more 
extensive, but after focusing more in the literature review to understand this type of 
transactions, I wanted to take a quick look at the market and how it operates. Thus, later 
someone can take my work done here, with many other works that we could find from 
other authors, and further analyse the market with more data, much more hours of study, 
and really try to help managers around Europe to succeed in any merger or acquisition.  
2. Gathering of data 
Firstly, to start the case study it was important to define the data that will be used, 
which sample of M&A transactions should be gathered. Later this data was extracted 
through the database of Factset and imported in Excel in order to realise all the analysis. 
This case study focuses on all the public mergers and acquisitions transaction that 
took place between 2015 and 2018 in Europe. Important to highlight that they must be 
completed transactions, which occurred between public companies, as it was the better way 
to ensure that all the information was available. In Appendix 2, we can find a list of all 
those transactions, including the completion date, the acquirer company’s name and 
country, along with the target company’s name, country and industry sector, and finally 
the transaction value in MM€. 
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3. Methodology 
Having all the data gathered together, and cleaned up if there was missing any 
information or there was any mistake, first I wanted to compute the abnormal return for 
each transaction, to know whether or not it created value (if it was positive or negative, as 
explained before in this research paper). To do so, I took the stock index of each market as 
the expected return and computed the real return, by using the initial and final price of the 
stocks and any dividends that were paid during the transaction, just as follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙	𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  
Later I used the formula of the abnormal return already explained: 𝐴𝑅LT = 𝑅LT − 𝑅UT 
Once I had the abnormal returns, I studied and analysed them grouping the 
transactions by countries, industries, years and size of transactions, as we can see on the 
next section. 
4. Market analysis and results 
4.1. Analysis by countries 
As the Figure 10 and Figure 11 from the Appendix show, first, the percentage of 
transactions on the acquirer country and the target country stay quite similar, as many of 
the transactions occur on the same country, and for those that are over two different 
countries “equilibrate” as maybe there is, for example, a transaction between UK and 
Spain, another from Spain to Italy, and another from Italy to UK. Another thing to point 
out is that United Kingdom and France are the countries in which more transactions occur, 
with almost 30% and 12% of the transactions form both countries, respectively. Later, there 
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is a big group of countries accounting between 2 and 7% of the European transactions, each 
of them, such as Germany, Italy, Sweden, Poland, Norway, Spain, etc.. 
This small analysis by countries could be important for a further work of analysis, 
resulting more interesting to analyse UK and France firstly, and then move on to the other 
countries, as we could find more data, more volume and, therefore, better conclusions on 
M&As in these countries (still waiting to see what happens if Brexit occurs).  
4.2. Analysis by industry 
There are lots of activities and industries in which the companies involved in M&As 
are operating, as we can see in Figure 12 from the Appendix. Nevertheless, I have tried to 
arrange them and group them in big groups of activities within the same industries, as we 
can see in Figure 6. With this smaller variety of industries, it was easier to analyse how the 
transactions went and whether it did or didn’t create value.  
 
 
Figure 6. Target’s industries grouped. 
Source: FactSet data and own work. 
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We can appreciate in Figure 7 the huge variation among industries, even we can 
see that most of them generate positive returns, translating into value created for 
shareholders. Even the difference between industries, which seems normal, it is important 
to highlight that the variation within each industry is quite small, 10% maximum, with the 
exception of telecommunications and technology. Makes sense having a higher variation 
in the returns among the transactions in this industry, as it is still evolving really fast and it 
is usually difficult to predict whether the merge will create value or not, and some of them 
can fail a lot or success a lot. 
 
Figure 7. Abnormal Return by industry. 
Source: own analysis. 
4.3. Analysis by year 
Regarding the years in which we took the transactions data, it is quite difficult to 
be able to draw a trend from any result obtained, especially as I studied just four 
consecutive years, and to be able to draw any trend we should analyse much more years 
and much more in detail. Nevertheless, just showing in Figure 8 the number of transactions 
that occur each year in the period of 2015-2018, which just points out that 2016 was the 
year with more transactions, almost 35 more (around 40% more) than the other years.  
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Figure 8. Number of transactions per year, 2015-2018. 
Source: FactSet data and own work. 
4.4. Analysis by size of the transaction 
In terms of size of the transactions, in Figure 13 from the Appendix, we can see that 
77% of the total involve less than 500 MM, meaning that it would be more useful to develop 
future studies for smaller transactions, as the conclusions could apply for the majority of 
further operations. Just remind that the size of the transaction affects its success and the 
value creation, therefore the study of a small or big transaction should be separated.  
 
Figure 9. Abnormal Return by transactions' size. 
Source: own work. 
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Analysing Figure 9, it seems that bigger the transactions, higher are the 
probabilities to fail. Nevertheless, the large differences may indicate that it is not always 
true and those differences could be significant, even having lower abnormal returns than 
smaller transactions. 
4.5. General analysis 
As a general analysis, with all the Annual Abnormal Return computed for each 
transaction, I defined a confidence interval for the mean of those returns, having as a results 
as follows: 
• Mean = 5.16% 
• Std. Deviation = 24.03% 
• 95% CI = [3.92%, 6.4%] 
Concluding that in average the M&A transactions in Europe from 2015 to 2018 
created value for the shareholders of the acquiring companies, but it is a result with a high 
standard deviation, resulting in many companies having much lower value creation (even 
negative, so value destruction) and others with much higher returns. Therefore, it is quite 
better to analyse this industry of M&As transactions by industries, countries, size of 
transactions, etc., as already done before in this research paper.
  
Final conclusion 
To conclude this research paper, I have to highlight that I have focused my attention 
mainly in the literature review, in reading and understanding much deeper the world of 
mergers and acquisitions. The main reason is because is a very extensive world in the 
finance environment, which needs a high understanding before even trying to get any 
conclusions with data samples. Therefore, I try to make a bit “easier”, or at least more 
“understandable”, for any future reader, who wants to penetrate in M&As analysis, so he 
or she could later focus more in a more data analysis and get some conclusions. 
After many hours of deep reading while working on this research paper, I can 
conclude that, or at least I want to point out, researchers and especially managers should 
focus their attention in two main topics: soft factors and shared value concept. On one hand, 
hard factors are widely analysed, like in this same paper, and widely known, but managers 
still do not pay attention to soft factor, to people and their reaction to a merge or acquisition. 
Once they can take more consideration in that and try to make their employees work and 
life better while the transaction occurs, the higher the probabilities of success will be. On 
the other hand, shared value, the concept introduced by McKinsey, from my point of view, 
should be highly known my managers and be in their priority tasks in order to succeed. 
Finally, this financial world of M&A transactions is huge, and very diverse, so it is 
difficult to take some conclusions with just data from a few transactions over the last 4 
years. Further analysis should be taken with a larger data sample and try to help managers 
to succeed in their duties.  
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Appendix 
1. Data gathering 
 
Figure 10. Acquirer’s countries. 
Source: FactSet data and own work. 
 
Figure 11. Target's countries. 
Source: FactSet data and own work. 
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Figure 12. Target’s industries. 
Source: FactSet data and own work. 
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Figure 13. Size of the transactions. 
Source: FactSet data and own work. 
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2. Deals list 
Completion 
Date Acquirer 
Acquirer 
Country 
Transaction 
Value (MM) Target 
Target 
Country Target Industry 
31-Dec-2018 Foncière des Régions SA France 786.44 Beni Stabili SpA SIIQ Italy Real Estate Investment 
Trusts 
27-Dec-2018 CaixaBank SA Spain 151.31 Banco BPI SA Portugal Major Banks 
26-Dec-2018 Alliance Rostec Auto BV Netherlands 60.80 AvtoVAZ PJSC Russian 
Federation 
Motor Vehicles 
18-Dec-2018 Société de la Tour Eiffel 
SA 
France 480.92 Affine RE SA France Real Estate Development 
13-Dec-2018 Lifull Co., Ltd.; Trovit 
Search SL 
Japan; Spain 114.25 Mitula Group Ltd. Spain Internet Software/Services 
13-Dec-2018 Navios Maritime 
Acquisition Corp. 
Monaco 29.27 Navios Maritime 
Midstream Partners LP 
Monaco Marine Shipping 
06-Dec-2018 Fundación Mapfre; Mapfre 
España Cia de Seguros y 
Reaseguros SA 
Spain 5.52 Funespaña SA Spain Other Consumer Services 
05-Dec-2018 Transocean Ltd. Switzerland 2,325.28 Ocean Rig UDW, Inc. Cyprus Oilfield 
Services/Equipment 
04-Dec-2018 Dagon Sverige AB Sweden 381.44 A Group of Retail Assets 
Sweden AB 
Sweden Real Estate Development 
30-Nov-2018 Vistula Group SA Poland 45.78 Bytom SA Poland Textiles 
28-Nov-2018 Ramsay Générale de Santé 
SA 
France 1,170.93 Capio AB Sweden Hospital/Nursing 
Management 
20-Nov-2018 INYPSA Informes y 
Proyectos SA 
Spain 142.70 Carbures Europe SA Spain Electrical Products 
16-Nov-2018 Vonovia SE Germany 5,358.74 Buwog AG Austria Real Estate Development 
16-Nov-2018 Groupe SFPI SA France 30.85 DOM Security SA France Metal Fabrication 
16-Nov-2018 Promethean Investments 
LLP 
United 
Kingdom 
89.10 Produce Investments Plc United 
Kingdom 
Agricultural 
Commodities/Milling 
16-Nov-2018 Plasta doo Slovenia 5.19 Tovarna olja GEA dd Slovenia Food: Specialty/Candy 
05-Nov-2018 Tele2 AB Sweden 3,703.15 Com Hem Holding AB Sweden Cable/Satellite TV 
02-Nov-2018 Télévision Française 1 SA France 81.88 Aufeminin SA France Internet Software/Services 
31-Oct-2018 Poolia AB Sweden 28.21 Uniflex AB Sweden Personnel Services 
19-Oct-2018 Mediaset SpA; Elettronica 
Industriale SpA; 2i Towers 
Holding SRL; 2i Towers 
Srl 
Italy 1,894.09 EI Towers SpA Italy Telecommunications 
Equipment 
18-Oct-2018 CareTech Holdings Plc United 
Kingdom 
338.01 Cambian Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Medical/Nursing Services 
17-Oct-2018 Basler Kantonalbank Switzerland 184.20 Bank Cler AG Switzerland Regional Banks 
17-Oct-2018 Fenice SpA Italy 29.43 Zephyro SpA Italy Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
15-Oct-2018 CYBG Plc United 
Kingdom 
1,948.71 Virgin Money Holdings 
UK Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
Savings Banks 
12-Oct-2018 Odyssey Europe AS Estonia 21.23 Olympic Entertainment 
Group AS 
Estonia Casinos/Gaming 
  70 
10-Oct-2018 Ligand Holdings UK Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
36.27 Vernalis Plc United 
Kingdom 
Pharmaceuticals: Major 
09-Oct-2018 ABRY Partners LLC; Link 
Mobility Group ASA 
/Private Group/ 
United States; 
Norway 
438.89 LINK Mobility Group 
ASA 
Norway Wireless 
Telecommunications 
04-Oct-2018 Russian Copper Co. Ltd. Russian 
Federation 
167.71 Amur Minerals Corp. Russian 
Federation 
Other Metals/Minerals 
01-Oct-2018 Polski Koncern Naftowy 
ORLEN SA 
Poland 995.26 UNIPETROL as Czech Republic Oil Refining/Marketing 
28-Sep-2018 Dalmore Capital Ltd.; 
Equitix Investment 
Management Ltd; Laing 
John Infrastructure Fund 
Ltd /Private Group/ 
United 
Kingdom 
1,597.87 John Laing Infrastructure 
Fund Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
Investment Managers 
24-Sep-2018 Vittoria Capital SpA (Italy) Italy 384.50 Vittoria Assicurazioni SpA Italy Multi-Line Insurance 
18-Sep-2018 Givaudan SA Switzerland 934.56 Naturex SA France Food: Specialty/Candy 
17-Sep-2018 Sopharma AD Bulgaria 2.79 Unipharm AD Bulgaria Pharmaceuticals: Other 
11-Sep-2018 FSN Capital Partners AS Norway 263.41 Saferoad Holding ASA Norway Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing 
31-Aug-2018 Medical Prognosis Institute 
A/S 
Denmark 27.35 Oncology Venture Sweden 
AB 
Denmark Biotechnology 
21-Aug-2018 Soitec SA; MBDA France 
SAS; MBDA Holding 
SAS; Dolphin Intégration 
SA /Private Group/ 
France 10.90 Dolphin Intégration SA France Semiconductors 
15-Aug-2018 Apollo Global Real Estate 
Management LP; Bremer 
Kreditbank AG; 
Grovepoint Capital LLP; 
Apollo Global 
Management LLC (Private 
Equity) 
United States; 
Germany; 
United 
Kingdom 
27.17 Oldenburgische 
Landesbank AG 
Germany Regional Banks 
13-Aug-2018 Eagle Bidco 2018 Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
5.56 Electronic Data Processing 
Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
Information Technology 
Services 
03-Aug-2018 Hochtief AG; Atlantia 
SpA; ACS Actividades de 
Construcción y Servicios 
SA; Abertis 
Infraestructuras SA 
/Private Group/ 
Germany; Italy; 
Spain 
31,246.16 Abertis Infraestructuras SA Spain Engineering & 
Construction 
03-Aug-2018 Playtech Plc United 
Kingdom 
83.40 SNAITECH SpA Italy Casinos/Gaming 
30-Jul-2018 Sella Open Fintech 
Platform SpA 
Italy 23.14 Vipera Plc United 
Kingdom 
Information Technology 
Services 
26-Jul-2018 Axens SA France 6.01 Heurtey Petrochem SA France Industrial Machinery 
19-Jul-2018 Government of Qatar; 
Qatar Holding LLC; GBT 
III BV 
Qatar; 
Netherlands 
479.84 Hogg Robinson Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Air Freight/Couriers 
12-Jul-2018 Phosphore SARL France 0.82 Groupe Rivalis SA France Information Technology 
Services 
02-Jul-2018 Inmobiliaria Colonial 
SOCIMI SA 
Spain 182.14 Axiare Patrimonio 
SOCIMI SA 
Spain Real Estate Investment 
Trusts 
02-Jul-2018 TCC Assets Ltd.; Frasers 
Property International Pte 
Ltd.; Frasers Property 
Investments Holland BV 
Singapore; 
Netherlands 
48.87 Geneba Properties NV Netherlands Real Estate Development 
30-Jun-2018 Melrose Industries Plc United 
Kingdom 
9,732.76 GKN Plc United 
Kingdom 
Auto Parts: OEM 
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29-Jun-2018 Icade SA France 61.62 ANF Immobilier SA France Real Estate Investment 
Trusts 
29-Jun-2018 Abris Capital Partners Sp 
zoo 
Poland 39.15 WDX SA Poland Industrial Machinery 
27-Jun-2018 Maritemi AB Sweden 8.95 Rasta Group AB Sweden Hotels/Resorts/Cruiselines 
21-Jun-2018 Antin Infrastructure 
Partners SAS; Goldman 
Sachs Asset Management 
LP (Private Equity); 
Cityfibre Infrastructure 
Holdings /Pvt Group/ 
France; United 
States; United 
Kingdom 
479.30 CITYFIBRE 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
HOLDINGS PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
Electrical Products 
20-Jun-2018 Compagnie Financière 
Richemont 
Switzerland 2,601.07 Yoox Net-A-Porter Group 
SpA 
Italy Catalog/Specialty 
Distribution 
15-Jun-2018 Informa Plc United 
Kingdom 
4,870.03 UBM Plc United 
Kingdom 
Publishing: 
Books/Magazines 
12-Jun-2018 Sanofi France 3,362.63 Ablynx NV Belgium Biotechnology 
08-Jun-2018 Fortbet Holdings Ltd. Cyprus 71.79 Fortuna Entertainment 
Group NV 
Netherlands Media Conglomerates 
08-Jun-2018 Ringkjøbing Landbobank 
A/S 
Denmark 466.63 Nordjyske Bank A/S Denmark Regional Banks 
07-Jun-2018 ATP Arbejdsmarkedets 
Tillægspension; PFA 
Pension; 
Pensionskassernes 
Administration A/S; 
Macquarie Infrastructure & 
Real Assets (Europe) Ltd.; 
TDC A/S (Private Group) 
Denmark; 
United 
Kingdom 
8,720.42 TDC A/S Denmark Major 
Telecommunications 
01-Jun-2018 Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
52.19 FreeAgent Holdings Plc United 
Kingdom 
Packaged Software 
31-May-2018 Compagnie Générale des 
Établissements Michelin 
SCA 
France 1,424.51 Fenner Plc United 
Kingdom 
Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing 
25-May-2018 Hanover Investors 
Management LLP 
United 
Kingdom 
29.19 Escher Group Holdings 
Ltd. 
Ireland Information Technology 
Services 
15-May-2018 UI Gestion SA France 0.20 Solia SA France Containers/Packaging 
09-May-2018 Freedom Finance JSC Kazakhstan 2.00 Asyl-Invest JSC Kazakhstan Investment Banks/Brokers 
27-Apr-2018 Allianz SE Germany 1,069.82 Euler Hermes Group SA France Multi-Line Insurance 
18-Apr-2018 TT Electronics Plc United 
Kingdom 
64.54 Stadium Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Electrical Products 
05-Apr-2018 Sampo Oyj; Nordic Capital 
Ltd.; Triona Holding SA 
Finland; United 
Kingdom; 
Switzerland 
471.76 Nordax Group AB Sweden Regional Banks 
03-Apr-2018 BC Investment 
Management Corp.; PAI 
Partners SAS; Refresco 
Group NV /Private Group/ 
Canada; 
France; 
Netherlands 
2,267.25 Refresco Group NV Netherlands Beverages: Non-
Alcoholic 
28-Mar-2018 GVC Holdings Plc United 
Kingdom 
5,605.30 LADBROKES CORAL 
GROUP PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
Media Conglomerates 
28-Mar-2018 Croda, Inc.; Croda Europe 
Ltd. 
United States; 
United 
Kingdom 
3.65 Plant Impact Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Chemicals: Agricultural 
27-Mar-2018 Hispania Activos 
Inmobiliarios SOCIMI SA 
Spain 1.83 Bay Hotels & Leisure 
SOCIMI SA 
Spain Hotels/Resorts/Cruiselines 
23-Mar-2018 Safran SA France 8,030.59 Zodiac Aerospace SA France Aerospace & Defense 
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20-Mar-2018 Transocean Ltd. Switzerland 2,695.35 Songa Offshore SE Cyprus Contract Drilling 
08-Mar-2018 Extentia Group Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
51.88 STYLES & WOOD 
GROUP PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
Miscellaneous 
05-Mar-2018 Tesco Plc United 
Kingdom 
4,226.01 Booker Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Food Distributors 
05-Mar-2018 Eurocommercial Properties 
NV 
Netherlands 468.00 Woluwe Shopping Center Belgium Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
26-Feb-2018 Natixis SA France 77.59 Dalenys SA Belgium Internet Software/Services 
23-Feb-2018 HgCapital LLP United 
Kingdom 
26.65 Dada SpA Italy Internet Software/Services 
23-Feb-2018 Vermeg Group NV Netherlands 58.46 Lombard Risk 
Management Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
Packaged Software 
21-Feb-2018 K-Holding SpA Italy 5.73 GEKOPLAST SA Poland Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing 
19-Feb-2018 Assystem Services 
Deutschland GmbH 
Germany 336.68 SQS Software Quality 
Systems AG 
Germany Information Technology 
Services 
13-Feb-2018 Highlight Communications 
AG; Studhalter Investment 
AG; Constantin Medien 
AG /Private Group 1/ 
Switzerland; 
Germany 
221.64 Constantin Medien AG Germany Movies/Entertainment 
13-Feb-2018 DTEK Power Trade LLC Ukraine 1.35 DTEK Dniproenergo PJSC Ukraine Electric Utilities 
13-Feb-2018 System Capital 
Management JSC; DTEK 
Power Trade LLC 
Ukraine 1.47 DTEK Zakhidenergo PJSC Ukraine Electric Utilities 
12-Feb-2018 Advent International 
Corp.; Sampo Oyj; 
Hellman & Friedman LLC; 
Bain Capital Private Equity 
LP; GIC Special 
Investments Pte Ltd.; 
StepStone Group LP; 
Fisher Lynch Capital LLC; 
Nets AS /Private Group/ 
United States; 
Finland; 
Singapore; 
Denmark 
3,415.92 Nets A/S Denmark Packaged Software 
06-Feb-2018 Promkhimtorg LLC Russian 
Federation 
8.12 Meleuz Mineral Fertilisers 
OJSC 
Russian 
Federation 
Chemicals: Agricultural 
01-Feb-2018 YIT Oyj Finland 798.33 Lemminkäinen Oyj Finland Engineering & 
Construction 
19-Jan-2018 Goldcup 15638 AB Sweden 511.33 Melker Schörling AB Sweden Investment Trusts/Mutual 
Funds 
15-Jan-2018 Montagu Private Equity 
LLP 
United 
Kingdom 
253.06 SERVELEC GROUP ltd United 
Kingdom 
Packaged Software 
05-Jan-2018 RiverRock European 
Capital Partners LLP 
United 
Kingdom 
175.91 ALNO AG Germany Building Products 
02-Jan-2018 Orion Capital Managers 
LLP; Orion IV European I 
SARL 
United 
Kingdom; 
Luxembourg 
1.49 Sotogrande SA Spain Real Estate Development 
28-Dec-2017 Absolute Invest Ltd. Switzerland 4.28 Altin AG Switzerland Investment Trusts/Mutual 
Funds 
26-Dec-2017 Synthos SA /Solowow/ Poland 577.64 Synthos SA Poland Containers/Packaging 
22-Dec-2017 Pallinghurst Resources 
Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
155.76 Gemfields Plc United 
Kingdom 
Other Metals/Minerals 
20-Dec-2017 Blackstone Corporate 
Private Equity; CVC 
Capital Partners Ltd.; 
Paysafe Group Plc /Private 
Group/ 
United States; 
United 
Kingdom 
3,282.47 PAYSAFE GROUP PLC United 
Kingdom 
Regional Banks 
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18-Dec-2017 Government of China; 
CNAC Saturn (NL) BV 
China; 
Netherlands 
42,006.69 Syngenta AG Switzerland Chemicals: Agricultural 
08-Dec-2017 Thermo Technologies 
SASU 
France 10.39 Thermocompact SA France Metal Fabrication 
01-Dec-2017 Tieto Sweden AB Sweden 48.34 Avega Group AB Sweden Information Technology 
Services 
17-Nov-2017 Irdi Soridec Gestion SAS; 
Parquest Capital SAS; CM 
CIC Investissement SA; 
Acces Industrie SA 
/Private Group/ 
France 3.81 Accès Industrie SA France Finance/Rental/Leasing 
10-Nov-2017 Talbot Holding AG Switzerland 239.46 ImmoMentum AG Switzerland Real Estate Development 
03-Nov-2017 Verint WS Holdings Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
25.16 eg solutions Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Packaged Software 
03-Nov-2017 F2i Fondi Italiani per le 
infrastrutture SGR SpA; 2i 
Fiber SpA; Marguerite 
Infrastructure Italy II 
SARL 
Italy; 
Luxembourg 
2.57 MC-link SpA Italy Information Technology 
Services 
01-Nov-2017 Michael Kors Holdings 
Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
1,136.98 Jimmy Choo Plc United 
Kingdom 
Apparel/Footwear 
01-Nov-2017 Clinigen Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
158.60 Quantum Pharma Holdings 
Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
Pharmaceuticals: Major 
25-Oct-2017 Vonovia SE Germany 120.27 conwert Immobilien Invest 
SE 
Austria Real Estate Development 
25-Oct-2017 Borealis Infrastructure 
Corp.; Tredje AP-fonden 
(Private Equity); Folksam 
/Private Equity/; Ellevio 
Holding 1 AB 
Canada; 
Sweden 
59.51 Elverket Vallentuna AB Sweden Electric Utilities 
23-Oct-2017 Finanziaria Internazionale 
Holding SpA (Private 
Equity); Agorà 
Investimenti SpA; Morgan 
Stanley Infrastructure, Inc.; 
Infrahub SRL 
Italy; United 
States 
457.01 SAVE SpA Italy Other Transportation 
18-Oct-2017 Mespila SA Poland 75.61 Paged SA Poland Forest Products 
17-Oct-2017 IP Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
566.74 Touchstone Innovations 
Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
Investment Managers 
12-Oct-2017 Karo Pharma AB Sweden 167.21 Weifa ASA Norway Pharmaceuticals: Major 
09-Oct-2017 Altrad UK Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
368.32 Cape Plc United 
Kingdom 
Financial Conglomerates 
09-Oct-2017 Altice NV Netherlands 632.76 SFR Group SA France Specialty 
Telecommunications 
06-Oct-2017 John Wood Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
3,749.62 Amec Foster Wheeler Plc United 
Kingdom 
Engineering & 
Construction 
06-Oct-2017 TLG Immobilien AG Germany 892.50 WCM Beteiligungs- und 
Grundbesitz AG 
Germany Real Estate Development 
05-Oct-2017 FIBA Beteiligungs- und 
Anlage GmbH 
Austria 21.23 BWT AG Austria Industrial Machinery 
27-Sep-2017 GetBack SA Poland 0.30 EGB Investments SA Poland Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
18-Sep-2017 Endeavour Mining Corp. United 
Kingdom 
97.13 Avnel Gold Mining Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Precious Metals 
15-Sep-2017 VTTI BV Netherlands 1,073.42 VTTI Energy Partners LP United 
Kingdom 
Wholesale Distributors 
12-Sep-2017 Elis SA France 2,985.25 Berendsen Plc United 
Kingdom 
Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
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12-Sep-2017 Calculus VCT Plc; 
Calculus Capital Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
2.72 Neptune-Calculus Income 
& Growth VCT Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
Investment Managers 
01-Sep-2017 Fiserv UK Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
52.45 Monitise Plc United 
Kingdom 
Packaged Software 
31-Aug-2017 BC Partners Ltd.; Pollen 
Street Capital Ltd.; 
Shawbrook Group Plc 
/Private Group/ 
United 
Kingdom 
608.16 Shawbrook Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Major Banks 
30-Aug-2017 Avingtrans Plc United 
Kingdom 
56.66 Hayward Tyler Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Industrial Machinery 
24-Aug-2017 Capital Stage AG Germany 16.51 CHORUS Clean Energy 
AG 
Germany Investment Managers 
24-Aug-2017 Patron Capital Advisers 
LLP 
United 
Kingdom 
1,945.44 PUNCH TAVERNS PLC United 
Kingdom 
Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
14-Aug-2017 Standard Life Plc United 
Kingdom 
4,383.37 Aberdeen Asset 
Management Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
Investment Managers 
11-Aug-2017 Banque Fédérative du 
Crédit Mutuel SA; Caisse 
Fédérale de Crédit Mutuel 
SA; Mutuelles 
Investissements SAS 
France 1,017.75 Crédit Industriel et 
Commercial SA 
France Financial Conglomerates 
08-Aug-2017 Chisbridge Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
19.00 InterQuest Group Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Personnel Services 
04-Aug-2017 EQT Partners AB Sweden 33.96 DGC One AB Sweden Specialty 
Telecommunications 
04-Aug-2017 Sport Business 
Acquisitions Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
4.74 Electric Word Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Publishing: 
Books/Magazines 
31-Jul-2017 Zoetis Belgium SA Belgium 63.08 Nexvet Biopharma Plc Ireland Pharmaceuticals: Major 
27-Jul-2017 Silver Lake Management 
Co. LLC; AltaOne Capital 
LLP; Cegid Group /Private 
Group/ 
United States; 
United 
Kingdom; 
France 
75.65 Cegid Group SA France Packaged Software 
26-Jul-2017 Permira Advisers LLP; 
Pantheon Holdco Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
177.34 TBS Group SpA Italy Information Technology 
Services 
24-Jul-2017 Asseco Business Solutions 
SA 
Poland 25.36 Macrologic SA Poland Packaged Software 
23-Jul-2017 Hansteen Holdings Plc United 
Kingdom 
32.51 Industrial Multi Property 
Trust Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
Investment Trusts/Mutual 
Funds 
18-Jul-2017 21 Centrale Partners SAS; 
Amundi Private Equity 
Funds SA; SWEN Capital 
Partners SA; DL Software 
SA /Private Group/ 
France 3.95 DL SOFTWARE SA France Packaged Software 
18-Jul-2017 Groupe Marc de 
Lacharrière SA 
France 206.44 Fimalac SA France Finance/Rental/Leasing 
18-Jul-2017 QInvest LLC; Atlas 
Merchant Capital LLC; 
Panmure Gordon & Co. 
Plc /Private Group/ 
Qatar; United 
States; United 
Kingdom 
10.13 Panmure Gordon & Co. 
Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
Investment Banks/Brokers 
13-Jul-2017 Phenomind Ventures SA; 
Stanusch Technologies SA 
/Private Group/ 
Poland 0.20 Stanusch Technologies SA Poland Information Technology 
Services 
11-Jul-2017 LabTech Investments Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
306.32 Market Tech Holdings Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Real Estate Investment 
Trusts 
05-Jul-2017 Fairfax Financial Holdings 
Ltd.; Ontario Municipal 
Employees Retirement 
System; Allied World 
Assurance Co. Holdings 
AG /Private Group/ 
Canada; 
Switzerland 
4,318.14 Allied World Assurance 
Company Holdings AG 
Switzerland Multi-Line Insurance 
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29-Jun-2017 Nokia Solutions & 
Networks Oy 
Finland 332.63 Comptel Oyj Finland Packaged Software 
29-Jun-2017 Element Materials 
Technology Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
888.06 Exova Group Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
21-Jun-2017 Solstad Offshore ASA 
/Old/ 
Norway 583.12 Deep Sea Supply Plc Cyprus Marine Shipping 
21-Jun-2017 Solstad Offshore ASA 
/Old/ 
Norway 1,331.41 Farstad Shipping ASA Norway Marine Shipping 
16-Jun-2017 Penta Capital LLP; 
Toscafund Asset 
Management LLP; Old 
Oak Holdings Ltd.; Circle 
Holdings Plc /Private 
Group/ 
United 
Kingdom 
60.87 Circle Holdings Plc United 
Kingdom 
Medical/Nursing Services 
07-Jun-2017 Banco Santander SA Spain 3,800.00 Banco Popular Español SA Spain Major Banks 
06-Jun-2017 Kindred Group Plc Malta 185.79 32Red Plc Gibraltar Media Conglomerates 
05-Jun-2017 DKL Investments Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
32.11 Ithaca Energy, Inc. United 
Kingdom 
Contract Drilling 
31-May-2017 NN Group NV Netherlands 2,458.54 NN Group Bidco BV Netherlands Life/Health Insurance 
29-May-2017 ReWorld Media SA France 4.98 Sporever SA France Internet Software/Services 
25-May-2017 Advent International 
Corp.; Inpost SA /Private 
Group/ 
United States; 
Poland 
36.35 InPost SA Poland Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
24-May-2017 Project Shortway Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
173.41 Sepura Plc United 
Kingdom 
Telecommunications 
Equipment 
18-May-2017 Indra Sistemas SA Spain 334.02 TECNOCOM 
Telecomunicaciones y 
Energía SA 
Spain Telecommunications 
Equipment 
01-May-2017 Axxess Capital Partners 
SA; Nextebank SA 
Romania 23.34 Banca Comerciala 
Carpatica SA 
Romania Regional Banks 
18-Apr-2017 Is Gayrimenkul Yatirim 
Ortakligi AS; Türkiye 
Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi 
AS 
Turkey 80.37 TSKB Gayrimenkul 
Yatirim Ortakligi AS 
Turkey Real Estate Investment 
Trusts 
17-Apr-2017 EKTOSintez OAO Russian 
Federation 
367.92 Uralorgsintez OJSC Russian 
Federation 
Chemicals: Specialty 
03-Apr-2017 Geoex Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
7.49 MultiClient Geophysical 
AS 
Norway Oilfield 
Services/Equipment 
31-Mar-2017 Munksjö Oyj Finland 809.07 Ahlstrom Oyj Finland Pulp & Paper 
31-Mar-2017 Betsson AB Sweden 20.64 NetPlay TV Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Internet Software/Services 
29-Mar-2017 Lem SpA Italy 2.68 Alba SpA Italy Investment Managers 
28-Mar-2017 Rhombi Holdings Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
742.11 e2v technologies Plc United 
Kingdom 
Aerospace & Defense 
27-Mar-2017 Vonovia SE Germany 2,810.53 conwert Immobilien Invest 
SE 
Austria Real Estate Development 
27-Mar-2017 CapMan Oyj Finland 117.83 Norvestia Oyj Finland Investment Managers 
21-Mar-2017 Wabtec France SAS France 771.42 Faiveley Transport France Trucks/Construction/Farm 
Machinery 
21-Mar-2017 Accenture Digital France 
Holdings SASU 
France 49.29 OCTO Technology SA France Information Technology 
Services 
21-Mar-2017 Talsu mezrupnieciba AS 
/Management/ 
Latvia 0.05 Talsu mezrupnieciba AS Latvia Forest Products 
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18-Mar-2017 Raiffeisen Bank 
International AG 
Austria 481.51 Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
Österreich AG 
Austria Major Banks 
13-Mar-2017 Altor AB; Altor Fund 
Manager AB 
Sweden 202.43 Transcom WorldWide AB Sweden Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
07-Mar-2017 Farmacol SA /Private 
Group/ 
Poland 129.82 Farmacol SA Poland Drugstore Chains 
06-Mar-2017 Tikehau Capital Advisors 
SAS 
France 169.51 Salvepar SAS France Financial Conglomerates 
20-Feb-2017 LOXAM SAS; Pragma 
Capital SA; 3i Private 
Equity 
France; United 
Kingdom 
539.02 Lavendon Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Finance/Rental/Leasing 
17-Feb-2017 Swordus Ireland Holding 
Ltd. 
Ireland 832.31 Fyffes Ltd. Ireland Agricultural 
Commodities/Milling 
15-Feb-2017 Severn Trent Water Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
156.04 Dee Valley Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Water Utilities 
14-Feb-2017 Armira GmbH & Co. KG; 
A.II Holding AG 
Germany 11.92 F24 AG Germany Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
07-Feb-2017 LNK Group Latvia 0.29 Latvijas Tilti AS Latvia Homebuilding 
30-Jan-2017 Axfood AB Sweden 53.44 Matse Holding AB Sweden Specialty Stores 
24-Jan-2017 Idox Plc United 
Kingdom 
36.77 6pm Holdings Plc Malta Information Technology 
Services 
24-Jan-2017 D Participation 
Management SA; DM 
Invest Srl 
Belgium; Italy 306.09 Moleskine SpA Italy Commercial 
Printing/Forms 
17-Jan-2017 Boryszew SA Poland 3.07 Hutmen SA Poland Other Metals/Minerals 
11-Jan-2017 MCA Orbital Global 
Holdings Ltd. 
Cyprus 15.66 Kleemann Hellas SA Greece Building Products 
03-Jan-2017 Norvestor Equity AS Norway 29.65 Nordic Camping & Resort 
AB 
Sweden Other Consumer Services 
01-Jan-2017 Banco Popolare Società 
Cooperativa SCRL 
Italy 5,006.61 Banca Popolare di Milano 
SCRL 
Italy Regional Banks 
27-Dec-2016 Allianz ZB doo; Valamar 
Riviera dd; Imperial dd 
/Private Group/ 
Croatia 28.15 Imperial dd Croatia Hotels/Resorts/Cruiselines 
23-Dec-2016 Daisy Group Ltd.; Oakley 
Capital Ltd. (Private 
Equity) 
United 
Kingdom 
217.52 Alternative Networks Plc United 
Kingdom 
Specialty 
Telecommunications 
22-Dec-2016 BDI Beteiligungs GmbH Austria 14.20 BDI - BioEnergy 
International AG 
Austria Industrial Machinery 
22-Dec-2016 DBAY Advisors Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
59.77 Creston Plc United 
Kingdom 
Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
22-Dec-2016 3D Systems Europe Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
3.83 Phenix Systems SAS France Information Technology 
Services 
22-Dec-2016 Deutsche Post AG Germany 298.99 UK Mail Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Air Freight/Couriers 
21-Dec-2016 Dimesilia Holdings Ltd. Cyprus 11.24 RusForest AB Sweden Forest Products 
20-Dec-2016 Molkerei Alois Müller 
GmbH & Co. KG; 
Sachsenmilch Anlagen 
Holding GmbH 
Germany 13.17 Sachsenmilch AG Germany Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
16-Dec-2016 OVS SpA; Aspen Trust 
Services Ltd.; Sempione 
Retail AG; Retails 
Investment S.R.L. 
Italy; 
Switzerland; 
Italy 
191.73 Charles Vögele Holding 
AG 
Switzerland Apparel/Footwear Retail 
15-Dec-2016 Harwood Private Equity; 
Harwood Capital LLP; 
United 
Kingdom 
20.81 Journey Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Restaurants 
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Vanguard Energy Group 
Ltd. 
15-Dec-2016 Friars 716 Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
21.21 SWP Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Financial Conglomerates 
14-Dec-2016 Cenergy Holdings SA Belgium 20.04 Corinth Pipeworks 
Holdings SA 
Greece Steel 
14-Dec-2016 Evotec AG Germany 51.09 Cyprotex Plc United 
Kingdom 
Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
13-Dec-2016 AFG Arbonia-Forster-
Holding AG 
Switzerland 177.38 Looser Holding AG Switzerland Industrial Specialties 
12-Dec-2016 Augment Investments Ltd. Cyprus 10.84 Pharmstandard PJSC Russian 
Federation 
Pharmaceuticals: Major 
09-Dec-2016 Solstad Offshore ASA 
/Old/ 
Norway 2.29 REM Offshore ASA Norway Finance/Rental/Leasing 
09-Dec-2016 Transocean Ltd. Switzerland 255.07 Transocean Partners LLC United 
Kingdom 
Contract Drilling 
28-Nov-2016 Abris Capital Partners Sp 
zoo 
Poland 56.27 Graal SA Poland Food: Meat/Fish/Dairy 
18-Nov-2016 BINBANK OAO; 
Darrington Enterprises Ltd. 
Russian 
Federation; 
Cyprus 
31.61 MDM Bank PJSC Russian 
Federation 
Major Banks 
17-Nov-2016 Comfort Enterprise 
(Germany) GmbH 
Germany 1.25 Medisana AG Germany Medical Specialties 
07-Nov-2016 Verizon Business 
International Holdings BV 
Netherlands 1,956.67 Fleetmatics Group Plc Ireland Packaged Software 
02-Nov-2016 Nokia Oyj Finland 579.20 Alcatel-Lucent SAS France Major 
Telecommunications 
28-Oct-2016 AVAST Software SRO Czech Republic 1,246.60 AVG Technologies NV Netherlands Packaged Software 
28-Oct-2016 HgCapital LLP United 
Kingdom 
4.69 Commify Italia SPA Italy Advertising/Marketing 
Services 
27-Oct-2016 Lerøy Seafood Group ASA Norway 108.44 Havfisk ASA Norway Agricultural 
Commodities/Milling 
27-Oct-2016 Lerøy Seafood Group ASA Norway 2.40 Norway Seafoods Group 
AS 
Norway Food Distributors 
14-Oct-2016 MERLIN Properties 
SOCIMI SA 
Spain 1.24 Testa Inmuebles en Renta 
SA 
Spain Real Estate Development 
12-Oct-2016 HeidelbergCement AG Germany 4,341.29 Italcementi Fabbriche 
Riunite Cemento SpA 
Italy Construction Materials 
05-Oct-2016 Zimmer Holdings France 
SAS 
France 48.97 Medtech SAS France Electronic 
Equipment/Instruments 
05-Oct-2016 Perella Weinberg Partners 
LP; Aermont Capital LLP 
United States 481.04 Pinewood Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Movies/Entertainment 
04-Oct-2016 Anheuser-Busch InBev SA 
/Old/ 
Belgium 109,440.58 SABMiller Plc United 
Kingdom 
Beverages: Alcoholic 
30-Sep-2016 Ardian SA; Hutton Collins 
Partners LLP; Dedalus 
SpA; Mandarin Capital 
Management SA 
France; United 
Kingdom; Italy; 
Luxembourg 
10.36 Noemalife SpA Italy Packaged Software 
26-Sep-2016 News Corp. UK & Ireland 
Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
265.36 Wireless Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Broadcasting 
23-Sep-2016 R&S Retail Group NV Netherlands 204.78 FNG Group NV Belgium Apparel/Footwear Retail 
22-Sep-2016 EQT Partners AB Sweden 168.21 Industrial & Financial 
Systems AB 
Sweden Information Technology 
Services 
22-Sep-2016 Eurazeo PME SA; 
Financière Orolia SAS 
France 9.91 Orolia SAS France Aerospace & Defense 
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21-Sep-2016 AQA Education United 
Kingdom 
6.99 DRS DATA AND 
RESEARCH SERVICES 
PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
Computer Peripherals 
20-Sep-2016 FIATC Mutua de Seguros 
y de Reaseguros APF 
Spain 8.99 Inverfiatc SA Spain Medical/Nursing Services 
19-Sep-2016 Groupe Lactalis SA France 22.45 Albalact SA Romania Food: Meat/Fish/Dairy 
16-Sep-2016 Steinhoff International 
Holdings NV 
Netherlands 586.56 Poundland Group Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Discount Stores 
15-Sep-2016 Harwood Private Equity; 
Harwood Capital LLP; 
Continental Investment 
Partners SA; Source 
Bioscience Plc /Private 
Group/ 
Switzerland; 
United 
Kingdom 
61.13 Source BioScience Plc United 
Kingdom 
Medical/Nursing Services 
15-Sep-2016 Inflection Management 
Corp. Ltd. 
Cyprus 9.52 Superglass Holdings Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Home Furnishings 
12-Sep-2016 Groupe FNAC SA France 1,437.09 Darty Plc United 
Kingdom 
Electronics/Appliance 
Stores 
07-Sep-2016 Tsesnabank JSC Kazakhstan 3.44 Plus Bank OJSC Russian 
Federation 
Regional Banks 
07-Sep-2016 Currie & Brown Holdings 
Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
51.33 Sweett Group Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
01-Sep-2016 J Sainsbury Plc United 
Kingdom 
1,497.31 Home Retail Group Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Department Stores 
29-Aug-2016 Cinetic Gesellschaft zur 
Entwicklung & Vertrieb 
von Medien 
Germany 8.46 Atevia AG Germany Internet Software/Services 
25-Aug-2016 Grimaldi Euromed SpA Italy 18.09 Finnlines Oyj Finland Air Freight/Couriers 
22-Aug-2016 BINBANK OAO Russian 
Federation 
0.31 Tveruniversalbank OAO Russian 
Federation 
Regional Banks 
15-Aug-2016 Hanover Investors 
Management LLP 
United 
Kingdom 
27.01 Hydro International Ltd. 
(United Kingdom) 
United 
Kingdom 
Water Utilities 
12-Aug-2016 Total SA France 996.26 Saft Groupe SA France Electrical Products 
05-Aug-2016 Mylan NV United 
Kingdom 
8,771.19 Meda AB Sweden Pharmaceuticals: Major 
02-Aug-2016 RPC Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
382.40 British Polythene 
Industries Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
Containers/Packaging 
31-Jul-2016 MK Group doo Serbia 12.47 AIK Banka AD Niš Serbia Regional Banks 
23-Jul-2016 Royal Ahold NV Netherlands 10,079.64 Delhaize Group SA Belgium Food Retail 
14-Jul-2016 Davide Campari-Milano 
SpA 
Italy 330.32 Société des Produits 
Marnier Lapostolle SA 
France Beverages: Alcoholic 
14-Jul-2016 Xvivo Perfusion AB Sweden 9.99 Vivoline Medical AB Sweden Medical Specialties 
13-Jul-2016 3i Group Plc; 3i 
Investments Plc; Layout 
Bidco A/S 
United 
Kingdom; 
Denmark 
188.19 BoConcept Holding A/S Denmark Specialty Stores 
01-Jul-2016 Apax Partners LLP; 
Neuberger Berman Group 
LLC 
United 
Kingdom; 
United States 
459.50 Engineering Ingegneria 
Informatica SpA 
Italy Packaged Software 
01-Jul-2016 NTT DoCoMo, Inc.; 
DOCOMO Digital GmbH 
Japan; 
Germany 
3.36 net mobile AG Germany Specialty 
Telecommunications 
29-Jun-2016 Hyster-Yale Capital 
Holding Italy SRL 
Italy 41.96 Bolzoni SpA Italy Trucks/Construction/Farm 
Machinery 
29-Jun-2016 Virom Group doo; South 
Frontier doo; Rafinerija 
Nafte Ad /Private Group/ 
Serbia 0.80 Rafinerija Nafte AD Serbia Industrial Specialties 
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24-Jun-2016 Gilde Investment 
Management BV; Todlin 
NV; Teslin Capital 
Management BV; Gilde 
Buy-Out Partners BV; 
Navitas Management BV; 
Navitas Management 
Fund; Royal Reesink NV 
/Private Group/ 
Netherlands 208.32 Royal Reesink BV Netherlands Wholesale Distributors 
22-Jun-2016 QIAGEN NV Netherlands 89.22 Exiqon A/S Denmark Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
13-Jun-2016 Italiaonline SpA /Old/; 
Libero Acquisition SARL 
Italy; 
Luxembourg 
58.27 Seat Pagine Gialle SpA Italy Commercial 
Printing/Forms 
10-Jun-2016 Government of Russia; 
Federal Hydro-Generating 
Co. RusHydro PJSC; East-
Finance LLC 
Russian 
Federation 
28.11 RAO Energy System of 
East PJSC 
Russian 
Federation 
Electric Utilities 
10-Jun-2016 Vectura Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
499.82 SkyePharma Plc United 
Kingdom 
Pharmaceuticals: Other 
03-Jun-2016 Centerbridge Partners LP; 
Mediona Sp zoo 
United States; 
Poland 
105.50 Magellan SA Poland Financial Conglomerates 
19-May-2016 Penta Capital LLP; 
Toscafund Asset 
Management LLP; 
InternetQ Plc /Private 
Group/ 
United 
Kingdom 
44.20 InternetQ Plc United 
Kingdom 
Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
19-May-2016 EQT Partners AB Sweden 1,216.73 Kuoni Reisen Holding AG Switzerland Other Consumer Services 
16-May-2016 Liberty Global Plc United 
Kingdom 
7,153.35 Cable & Wireless 
Communications Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
Specialty 
Telecommunications 
10-May-2016 Olsten (U.K.) Holdings 
Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
115.75 Penna Consulting Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
09-May-2016 Tangent Communications 
Plc /Management/ 
United 
Kingdom 
7.80 Tangent Communications 
Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
04-May-2016 Foliateam SASU; 
Bpifrance Participations 
SA /PRIVATE EQUITY/ 
France 0.46 Acropolis Telecom SA France Specialty 
Telecommunications 
04-May-2016 Bonheur ASA Norway 55.98 Ganger Rolf ASA Norway Marine Shipping 
29-Apr-2016 Goldcup 12279 AB Sweden 1.09 Agellis Group AB Sweden Electronic 
Equipment/Instruments 
14-Apr-2016 LGT Capital Partners AG; 
LGT Group Foundation; 
Danske Koncept 
Restauranter Holding ApS; 
Etib Holding II AB; 
Beckett Sec Ltd.; Amcon 
Invest ApS; Ventiga 
Capital Partners LLP 
Switzerland; 
Liechtenstein; 
Denmark; 
Sweden; 
Ireland; 
Denmark; 
United 
Kingdom 
50.13 Nordic Service Partners 
Holding AB 
Sweden Restaurants 
08-Apr-2016 Government of Finland; 
Fortum Oyj 
Finland 110.93 Grupa Duon SA Poland Gas Distributors 
04-Apr-2016 Permira Holdings Ltd.; 
Just Retirement Group Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
1,032.59 Partnership Assurance 
Group Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
Life/Health Insurance 
01-Apr-2016 Endress+Hauser 
(Deutschland) AG+Co. KG 
Germany 8.38 Analytik Jena AG Germany Medical Specialties 
31-Mar-2016 Enel SpA Italy 3,259.44 Enel Green Power SpA Italy Electric Utilities 
31-Mar-2016 Cathexis UK Holdings Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
6.94 ISG Central Services Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Engineering & 
Construction 
31-Mar-2016 voestalpine Vae GmbH Austria 0.86 voestalpine VAE 
APCAROM SA 
Romania Trucks/Construction/Farm 
Machinery 
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30-Mar-2016 MultiQ International AB Sweden 0.14 Mermaid AS Denmark Computer Peripherals 
29-Mar-2016 Mediosmanagement 
GmbH 
Germany 0.23 CREVALIS Capital AG Germany Medical Distributors 
24-Mar-2016 Government of Russia; 
Bashneft PJSOC 
Russian 
Federation 
46.07 Ufaorgsintez PJSC Russian 
Federation 
Chemicals: Specialty 
18-Mar-2016 Oddo & Cie SCA France 596.37 BHF Kleinwort Benson 
Group SA 
Belgium Investment Managers 
18-Mar-2016 Lafarge Cementos SAU Spain 9.63 Heracles General Cement 
Co. SA 
Greece Construction Materials 
17-Mar-2016 ING Groep NV; Gilde 
Investment Management 
BV; Parcom Capital 
Management BV; Gilde 
Buy-Out Partners BV; 
ABN AMRO Participaties 
Management BV; ABN 
AMRO Group NV; Royal 
Ten Cate NV /Private 
Group/ 
Netherlands 931.70 Royal Ten Cate NV Netherlands Textiles 
15-Mar-2016 Baronsmead VCT 3 Plc United 
Kingdom 
95.09 Baronsmead VCT 4 Plc United 
Kingdom 
Investment Managers 
15-Mar-2016 Siberian Coal Energy Co. 
JSC; Madake Enterprises 
Co. Ltd.; Suek Plc 
Russian 
Federation; 
Cyprus 
9.90 Primorskugol JSC Russian 
Federation 
Coal 
14-Mar-2016 Alychlo NV; Wildo 
Properties SA; Perennitas 
SA 
Belgium 25.23 Pairi Daiza NV Belgium Other Consumer Services 
09-Mar-2016 Den Hartogh Holding BV Netherlands 130.42 InterBulk Group Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Air Freight/Couriers 
04-Mar-2016 Sabeton SA France 0.29 Compagnie Agricole de la 
Crau SA 
France Wholesale Distributors 
01-Mar-2016 Fairfax Financial Holdings 
Ltd.; ACON Investments 
LLC; Albright Capital 
Management LLC; APR 
Energy Plc /Private Group/ 
Canada; United 
States; United 
Kingdom 
668.49 APR Energy Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Electric Utilities 
26-Feb-2016 Viohalco SA/NV Belgium 222.45 ELVAL Holdings SA Greece Aluminum 
25-Feb-2016 Aarhus University 
Research Foundation 
Denmark 0.33 Auriga Industries A/S Denmark Chemicals: Agricultural 
25-Feb-2016 Renaissance Construction 
A.S. 
Russian 
Federation 
1.42 Ballast Nedam NV Netherlands Engineering & 
Construction 
22-Feb-2016 Catena AB Sweden 476.16 Tribona AB Sweden Real Estate Development 
22-Feb-2016 CORESTATE Capital AG; 
Corestate Ben BidCo AG 
Switzerland; 
Germany 
1.38 Youniq AG Germany Real Estate Development 
19-Feb-2016 Randstad Nordic AB Sweden 192.09 Proffice AB Sweden Personnel Services 
16-Feb-2016 Argos Soditic SA; Partners 
in Action SA 
Switzerland; 
France 
14.62 EFESO Consulting SA France Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
15-Feb-2016 Royal Dutch Shell Plc Netherlands 74,734.72 BG Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Oil & Gas Production 
12-Feb-2016 Ilim Timber Industry LLC Russian 
Federation 
49.52 Ust-Ilimskiy LDZ Russian 
Federation 
Pulp & Paper 
08-Feb-2016 Altice NV; Groupe News 
Participations SAS 
Netherlands; 
France 
300.25 NextRadioTV SA France Broadcasting 
05-Feb-2016 Government of Russia; 
VTB Bank PJSC; Federal 
Agency for State Property 
Management 
Russian 
Federation 
70.90 Bank of Moscow OJSC Russian 
Federation 
Major Banks 
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02-Feb-2016 Paddy Power Plc Ireland 2,936.68 Betfair Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Internet Software/Services 
01-Feb-2016 Amaya, Inc.; GVC 
Holdings Plc 
Canada; United 
Kingdom 
1,303.20 bwin.party digital 
entertainment Plc 
Gibraltar Media Conglomerates 
27-Jan-2016 Octopus Apollo VCT Plc United 
Kingdom 
20.43 Octopus VCT 2 Plc United 
Kingdom 
Investment Managers 
21-Jan-2016 DIAS Publishing House 
Ltd.; Kronos Press Agency 
Public Co. Ltd. /Private 
Group/; Phileleftheros PCL 
Cyprus 0.41 Kronos Press Agency 
Public Co. Ltd. 
Cyprus Wholesale Distributors 
21-Jan-2016 Euromin Holdings 
(Cyprus) Ltd.; Vitol R&M 
SA 
Cyprus; 
Switzerland 
32.22 Ventspils Nafta AS Latvia Marine Shipping 
18-Jan-2016 Rockhopper Exploration 
Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
43.72 Falkland Oil & Gas Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Oil & Gas Production 
12-Jan-2016 Unicorn Asset 
Management Ltd.; Unicorn 
AIM VCT Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
13.30 Rensburg AIM VCT Plc United 
Kingdom 
Investment Managers 
11-Jan-2016 Sigvaris Holding AG Switzerland 1.64 Pani Teresa Medica SA Poland Medical Distributors 
08-Jan-2016 Axios Bidco Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
603.18 The Innovation Group Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
06-Jan-2016 Balfour Beatty 
Infrastructure Partners 
LLP; Balfour Beatty 
Investment Holdings Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
106.58 Alkane Energy Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Electric Utilities 
31-Dec-2015 Asseco Poland SA Poland 32.19 Infovide Matrix SA Poland Information Technology 
Services 
30-Dec-2015 VP Exploitatie NV Netherlands 23.64 Batenburg Techniek NV Netherlands Electronic 
Equipment/Instruments 
28-Dec-2015 William Demant Holding 
A/S; The Oticon 
Foundation 
Denmark 7.73 Audika Groupe SAS France Medical Distributors 
23-Dec-2015 Beko 
Beteiligungsvervaltung OG 
Germany 5.15 Beko Holding AG Austria Information Technology 
Services 
23-Dec-2015 Établissements Maurel & 
Prom SA 
France 215.59 MPI SA France Oil & Gas Production 
22-Dec-2015 Volution Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
10.87 Energy Technique Plc United 
Kingdom 
Oilfield 
Services/Equipment 
21-Dec-2015 Deutsche Bank AG Germany 245.41 Deutsche Postbank AG Germany Major Banks 
18-Dec-2015 Foresight VCT Plc United 
Kingdom 
58.50 Foresight 2 VCT Plc United 
Kingdom 
Investment Managers 
18-Dec-2015 Delphi Automotive Plc United 
Kingdom 
1,653.17 HellermannTyton Group 
Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
Electrical Products 
17-Dec-2015 Tequity AB; Viltor AB Sweden 34.28 Cybercom Group AB Sweden Information Technology 
Services 
17-Dec-2015 Monterey Capital II SARL Luxembourg 237.84 Infinis Energy Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Electric Utilities 
14-Dec-2015 Siparex Proximité 
Innovation SAS; Re-
Sources 1 SASU; 
Imprimerie Jean-Bernard 
SASU; H.G.D. 
Participations SAS 
France 1.64 Schaeffer Dufour SA France Investment Managers 
03-Dec-2015 FGC Finanziaria SRL Italy 83.70 Vianini Lavori SpA Italy Engineering & 
Construction 
02-Dec-2015 Mitterbauer Beteiligungs-
AG 
Austria 68.50 Miba AG Austria Metal Fabrication 
01-Dec-2015 Dimco Plc /Management/ Cyprus 1.07 Dimco Plc Cyprus Electrical Products 
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28-Nov-2015 Cordiant JSC Russian 
Federation 
1.90 Cordiant JSC (Yaroslavl) Russian 
Federation 
Automotive Aftermarket 
26-Nov-2015 Saverco NV Belgium 278.95 Compagnie Maritime 
Belge SA 
Belgium Airlines 
24-Nov-2015 Rostelecom Long-Distance 
& Intl 
Telecommunications Co. 
PJSC 
Russian 
Federation 
3.65 Bashinformsvyaz PJSC Russian 
Federation 
Specialty 
Telecommunications 
17-Nov-2015 Sacturino Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
5,192.08 Polyus Gold International 
Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
Precious Metals 
16-Nov-2015 Eurasia Drilling Co. Ltd. 
/Private Group/ 
Russian 
Federation 
445.35 Eurasia Drilling Co. Ltd. Russian 
Federation 
Contract Drilling 
10-Nov-2015 Quixant Plc United 
Kingdom 
12.82 Densitron Technologies 
Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
Electronic Production 
Equipment 
09-Nov-2015 Dufry Financial Services 
BV 
Netherlands 1,301.81 World Duty Free SRL Italy Specialty Stores 
06-Nov-2015 Camfin SpA; Rosneft; 
Government of China; 
China National Chemical 
Corp.; Intesa Sanpaolo 
SpA; UniCredit SpA; 
China National Tire & 
Rubber Co., Ltd.; Lauro 
Sessantuno SpA; Long-
term Investments 
Luxembourg SA; Marco 
Polo Industrial Holding 
SpA 
Italy; Russian 
Federation; 
China; 
Luxembourg 
6,363.97 Pirelli & C. SpA Italy Automotive Aftermarket 
23-Oct-2015 LafargeHolcim Ltd. Switzerland 638.29 Lafarge SA France Construction Materials 
16-Oct-2015 Providence Equity Partners 
LLC; Providence Equity 
Partners, Inc.; WPP Plc; 
Chime Communications 
Plc /Private Group/ 
United States; 
United 
Kingdom 
512.94 Chime Communications 
Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
15-Oct-2015 Solix Group AB Sweden 7.32 Aktiebolaget Geveko Sweden Wholesale Distributors 
15-Oct-2015 ICA Gruppen AB; ICA-
handlarnas Förbund AB 
Sweden 23.59 Hemtex AB Sweden Wholesale Distributors 
01-Oct-2015 Sweco AB Sweden 379.11 Grontmij NV Netherlands Engineering & 
Construction 
30-Sep-2015 Telecom Italia SpA Italy 15.76 Telecom Italia Media SpA Italy Commercial 
Printing/Forms 
29-Sep-2015 Qino Capital Partners AG; 
Swissburg AG 
Switzerland 15.40 Qino Flagship AG Switzerland Financial Conglomerates 
28-Sep-2015 Southbank Media Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
771.36 TVN SA Poland Broadcasting 
25-Sep-2015 Bentley Park Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
53.92 Inspired Capital Plc United 
Kingdom 
Finance/Rental/Leasing 
17-Sep-2015 Edenred France SAS; 
SECAFI Changement 
Travail Santé SAS; PwCE 
Participations SASU 
France 4.83 ProWebCE SA France Packaged Software 
16-Sep-2015 Lagardère Active SAS France 4.66 LeGuide.com SA France Internet Software/Services 
15-Sep-2015 Sky German Holdings 
GmbH 
Germany 228.63 Sky Deutschland AG Germany Cable/Satellite TV 
14-Sep-2015 Münchener 
Rückversicherungs-
Gesellschaft AG 
Germany 4.88 Forst Ebnath AG Germany Forest Products 
11-Sep-2015 Vivendi SA; Groupe 
CANAL+ SA 
France 395.22 Société d'Edition de Canal 
Plus SA 
France Broadcasting 
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04-Sep-2015 Hardstaff Dual Fuel 
Technology Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
0.34 Clean Air Power Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
Auto Parts: OEM 
04-Sep-2015 International Hotel 
Investments Plc; Corinthia 
Palace Hotel Co. Ltd. 
Malta 105.65 Island Hotels Group 
Holdings plc 
Malta Hotels/Resorts/Cruiselines 
24-Aug-2015 Kompania Górnicza Sp 
zoo 
Poland 118.38 Dolnoslaskie Surowce 
Skalne Sp zoo 
Poland Other Metals/Minerals 
21-Aug-2015 Banco de Sabadell SA Spain 2,121.06 TSB Banking Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Regional Banks 
20-Aug-2015 Ferrero International SA; 
Ferholding UK Ltd. 
Luxembourg; 
United 
Kingdom 
180.95 Thorntons Plc United 
Kingdom 
Food: Specialty/Candy 
14-Aug-2015 Capital Holding SIA Latvia 0.14 Rigas Pharmaceutical 
Factory JSC 
Latvia Pharmaceuticals: Major 
13-Aug-2015 Keysight Technologies 
Netherlands BV 
Netherlands 476.47 Anite Plc United 
Kingdom 
Information Technology 
Services 
07-Aug-2015 Harwood Capital LLP; 
Harwood Bidco Ltd.; 
Indoor Bowling Equity 
Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
62.27 Essenden Plc United 
Kingdom 
Media Conglomerates 
07-Aug-2015 Lagardère Active SAS France 2.92 Lagardère Active 
Broadcast 
Monaco Broadcasting 
04-Aug-2015 DM Grain-Corn doo Serbia 2.01 Luka Dunav AD Serbia Other Transportation 
31-Jul-2015 Westland Horticulture Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
51.49 William Sinclair Holdings 
Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
Chemicals: Agricultural 
30-Jul-2015 Boursorama SA France 0.76 OnVista AG Germany Internet Software/Services 
28-Jul-2015 KUKA Beteiligungen 
(Schweiz) AG 
Switzerland 12.74 Swisslog Holding AG Switzerland Information Technology 
Services 
23-Jul-2015 1Spatial Plc United 
Kingdom 
2.38 ENABLES IT GROUP 
PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
Information Technology 
Services 
22-Jul-2015 Viohalco SA/NV Belgium 29.81 Sidenor Holdings SA Greece Steel 
17-Jul-2015 Daisy Group Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
251.64 Phoenix IT Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Information Technology 
Services 
13-Jul-2015 Circassia Pharmaceuticals 
Plc 
United 
Kingdom 
170.70 Aerocrine AB Sweden Electronic 
Equipment/Instruments 
13-Jul-2015 Scanfil Oyj Finland 75.71 PartnerTech AB Sweden Electrical Products 
10-Jul-2015 ING Groep NV; Riva 
Investments BV; Marsala 
BV; Florijn Investments 
BV; Stichting 
Administratiekantoor 
WAN; J.G.H.M. Niessen; 
International Media 
Solutions BV 
Netherlands 1.76 Roto Smeets Group NV Netherlands Commercial 
Printing/Forms 
30-Jun-2015 HitecVision Private Equity 
AS; HV VII Invest Manna 
II AS 
Norway 16.66 Rocksource ASA Norway Oilfield 
Services/Equipment 
29-Jun-2015 AEVIS Holding SA Switzerland 27.99 Victoria-Jungfrau 
Collection AG 
Switzerland Hotels/Resorts/Cruiselines 
26-Jun-2015 Xtrackers (IE) PLC; 
Xtrackers FTSE All-World 
ex UK UCITS ETF 
Ireland 45.06 db x-trackers FTSE All-
World ex UK UCITS ETF 
Luxembourg Investment Trusts/Mutual 
Funds 
26-Jun-2015 Xtrackers (IE) PLC; 
Xtrackers S&P 500 Equal 
Weight UCITS ETF 
Ireland 31.11 db x-trackers S&P 500 
Equal Weight UCITS ETF 
Luxembourg Investment Trusts/Mutual 
Funds 
15-Jun-2015 Madake Enterprises Co. 
Ltd.; Suek Plc 
Cyprus 2.63 Primorskugol JSC Russian 
Federation 
Coal 
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09-Jun-2015 English Rose Enterprises 
Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
25.88 Beale Plc United 
Kingdom 
Department Stores 
27-May-2015 Kofola a.s.; KSM 
Investment SA 
Czech 
Republic; 
Luxembourg 
4.14 RADENSKA doo Slovenia Beverages: Non-
Alcoholic 
22-May-2015 E & Funktionstechnik 
Holding AG 
Germany 4.89 EHLEBRACHT AG Germany Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing 
19-May-2015 CoSine Communications, 
Inc.; Cedar 2015 Ltd. 
United States; 
United 
Kingdom 
47.06 API Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
Containers/Packaging 
07-May-2015 Palamon Capital Partners 
LP; Quilvest & Partners 
SA; Towry Finance Co. 
Ltd. 
Luxembourg; 
United 
Kingdom 
164.85 ASHCOURT ROWAN 
PLC 
United 
Kingdom 
Investment Managers 
30-Apr-2015 NCC Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
69.08 Accumuli Plc United 
Kingdom 
Information Technology 
Services 
14-Apr-2015 Nordeka JSC /Savickis/ Latvia 0.11 Nordeka AS Latvia Hotels/Resorts/Cruiselines 
02-Apr-2015 Matchtech Group Plc United 
Kingdom 
84.13 Networkers International 
(UK) Ltd. 
United 
Kingdom 
Personnel Services 
30-Mar-2015 MOL Hungarian Oil & 
Gas Plc 
Hungary 19.50 Mol Petrolkémia Zrt. Hungary Chemicals: Specialty 
21-Mar-2015 Atine Group Oy Finland 1.44 Turvatiimi Oyj Finland Miscellaneous 
Commercial Services 
13-Mar-2015 Project Panther Bidco Ltd. United 
Kingdom 
42.44 Aspiro AB Sweden Packaged Software 
23-Feb-2015 Ostrc doo Slovenia 9.14 Dalmacijavino dd Croatia Beverages: Alcoholic 
19-Jan-2015 Fraport AG Frankfurt 
Airport Services 
Worldwide 
Germany 4.72 Aerodrom Ljubljana dd Slovenia Other Transportation 
 
